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I. INTRODUCTION

The notion that children need to be sheltered from inappropriate speech
long predates Janet Jackson's "wardrobe malfunction" or Bono's
expletive-enhanced acceptance of a Golden Globe.' Plato expressed
concern about youths' impressionable minds 2300 years ago, stressing that
the tales the "young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts."'

1. See Editorial, An Indecent Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2004, at A26.
2. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. II, at 281 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Walter J. Black, Inc. 1942)
(circa 360 B.C.). Aristotle similarly believed that children should be protected from harmful speech.
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. 7, ch. 17, at 223-26 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1998)
(circa 350 B.C.). He thought that minors should be sheltered from "shameful talk" and forbidden
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John Stuart Mill, writing 2000 years after Plato, similarly endorsed limits
on children's speech rights. The rights he described applied only "to
human beings in the maturity of their faculties" because young people were
not "capable of being improved by free and equal discussion."3 All of this,
of course, long preceded Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
Chairman Michael Powell's clampdown on broadcast indecency and
Howard Stem's characterization of the clampdown as a "McCarthy-type
witch hunt."4
Notwithstanding its ancient lineage, the concept of sheltering children
from speech is largely a modem conceit. The concept, after all,
presupposes a "childhood"-a prolonged period of innocence-that was
rare in premodem times and continues to be rare in many parts of the
world.5 Put bluntly, children in the Middle Ages, who slept in their parents'
beds and were married off "as close to puberty as possible,"6 did not need
sheltering from sexually-explicit speech. Similarly, contemporary children
living in war-tom countries like Congo-where war has "shuttered their
schools, left them lame and hungry, [and] killed their parents before their
eyes"7-need more than limited access to violent video games to learn
peaceful conflict resolution.
Of course, the fact that so many children are robbed of their childhoods
does not mean that societies that can afford to let their youth ease into
adulthood should not try to regulate their access to speech. Many countries
do in fact regulate children's access to speech, even if they differ over

"to witness iambus or comedy." Id.
3. J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 9 (R.
B. McCallum ed., Basil Blackwell 1948) (1869). John Locke noted that children "are not born in
[a] state of equality" and that "parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them, when they
come into the world." JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 54-55, at 31 (C. B.
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690).
4. Jacques Steinberg, F.C.C. to Fine Clear Channel $495,000 for Sex Talk, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 2004, at C3.
5. In his influential book, Centuries of Childhood, the French historian Philippe Aries
argued that the concept of childhood as a period of innocence did not begin until the seventeenth
century. See generally PHILIPPE ARItS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY

LIFE (Robert Baldick trans., Vintage Books 1962) (1960) (explaining that the concept of childhood
innocence did not exist at the beginning of the seventeenth century).
6.

MARiORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN: "INDECENCY," CENSORSHIP, AND THE

INNOCENCE OF YOUTH 16-17 (2001) (quoting Peter Brown, Late Antiquity, in 1 A HISTORY OF
PRIVATE LIFE 265 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., P. Arie's & G. Duby eds., 1987)).
7. Somini Sengupta, Innocence of Youth Is Victim of Congo War, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
2003, at Al. As the author notes, the warlords in Congo "have killed even childhood." Id.
Columnist Nicholas Kristof has similarly noted that "[t]here is no childhood" in Darfur, Sudan,
where he observed a four-year-old refugee who was responsible for carrying her thirteen-month-old
brother because the rest of her family was missing and presumed dead. Nicholas D. Kristof,
Magboula'sBrush with Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at A23.
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which speech they consider harmful or over the proper methods for
regulating the speech.8 Even the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child, which requires signatories to "ensure that the child has access
to information and material," qualifies this obligation by allowing nations
to establish "appropriate guidelines for the protection of the child from
information and material injurious to his or her well-being."9
This desire to protect children, though well-intentioned, has always
been on a collision course with freedom of speech. The collision between
these two values has occurred gradually. It not only had to await the
development of societies where "childhood" could flourish, but it also had
to await the rise of media outlets accessible to children, governments
inclined to regulate those outlets, and robust free speech values that called
this regulation into question."° The tension between free speech and
protecting children may have simmered for centuries, but only in recent
years, with the advent of pervasive media technologies, has it risen to a
boil.
In the United States, the conflict between free speech and protecting
children manifests itself in First Amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme
Court first wrestled with the issue in the 1950s and 60s.1 Ginsbergv. New
York, the Court's seminal 1968 decision, upheld the conviction of a New
York bookseller who sold "girlie magazines" to minors; these magazines
were fully protected speech as to adults but, the Court said, could be denied

8. France, for instance, is more relaxed about children's exposure to sexual materials than
the United States. Elaine Sciolino, The FrenchSpar over Sex: There's a Limit, No?, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2002, § 1, at 3 (noting that France is a place where "comer kiosks display blown-up
magazine covers of bare-breasted women" and "tabloids run advertisements featuring simulations
of sex acts," but also noting a new movement by French parents to limit hard-core pornography on
television); see also Michael D. Birnhack & Jacob H. Rowbottom, Shielding Children: The
European Way, 79 CH.-KENT L. REV. 175 (2004) (discussing European responses to Internet
material that is harmful to children).
9. Convention on the Rights of the Child, openedfor signatureNov. 20, 1989, art. 17,28
I.L.M. 1448, 1462-63, availableat http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r025.htm.
10. Sissela Bok acknowledges that there is "nothing new" about violence as entertainment
and that people have long "watched hangings and other public executions with awe and relish."
SISSELA BOK, MAYHEM: VIOLENCE AS PUBLIC ENTERTAINMENT 4 (1998). Still, she notes that "it
is only in the last five decades that ...people [have been able] to tune in to violent programming
with graphic immediacy on home screens at all hours of the day and night." Id.
First Amendment limitations on child-protection censorship became relevant only after the
expansion of adults' free speech rights. Prior to that time, there were few obstacles to denying both
adults and children access to speech. At one point, for instance, courts used the English Hicklin test
in obscenity cases, which allowed the government to ban speech based on its effect on the most
impressionable members of society. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486, 488-89
(1957) (citing Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868)) (noting that courts had used the Hicklin
test but finding it "unconstitutionally restrictive").
11. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,631 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City
of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 678 (1968); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 381 (1957).
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to minors. 2 In recent years, as lawmakers have aggressively regulated new
media technologies, the Court has produced a steady stream of decisions.
During the last ten years alone, the Court has issued seven decisions on the
constitutionality of child-protection censorship. 3
The Court's precedent establishes three overarching principles that reoccur throughout its jurisprudence. First, the Supreme Court acknowledges
the government's power to enact child-protection censorship; in other
words, the government may deny minors access to speech that it cannot
deny to adults. 4 Second, the Court acknowledges that minors have free
speech rights that can occasionally trump the government's interest in
censorship.' 5 Third, the Court recognizes that child-protection censorship
12. Ginsberg,390 U.S. at 634.
13. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2788, 2795 (2004) (enjoining enforcement of the
Child Online Protection Act); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 203 (2003)
(finding Children's Internet Protection Act constitutional); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566
(2002) (holding that the use of contemporary "community standards" in the Child Online Protection
Act did not render the act facially unconstitutional); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,
566-67 (2001) (finding Massachusetts regulation of cigar and smokeless tobacco advertising
unconstitutional); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 807 (2000) (finding
section 505 of the Telecommunications Act unconstitutional); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849
(1997) (finding the Communications Decency Act of 1996 unconstitutional); Denver Area Educ.
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1996) (finding aspects of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 unconstitutional). During this period,
the Court also decided a related case concerning the regulation of "virtual" child-pornography.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 239-40 (2002).
14. This principle from Ginsberg is firmly established in the jurisprudence. See generally
Dawn C. Nunziato, Toward a ConstitutionalRegulation of Minors' Access to Harmful Internet
Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 121, 128 (2004) (noting that Ginsbergand related cases "make clear
that legislators may constitutionally restrict minors' access to speech that they cannot
constitutionally restrict adults' access to"). The Court makes this point by stating that the
government's interest in protecting children from harmful speech is "compelling." See, e.g., Am.
concurring in the judgment) (stating that "[t]he
LibraryAss 'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 215 (Kennedy, J.,
interest in protecting young library users from material inappropriate for minors is legitimate, and
even compelling, as all Members of the Court appear to agree"); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium,Inc., 518 U.S. at 743 (stating that "the provision before us comes accompanied with
an extremely important justification, one that this Court has often found compelling-the need to
protect children from exposure to patently offensive sex-related material"); Sable Communications
of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (recognizing a "compelling interest in protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of minors" and stating that this "interest extends to shielding
minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards").
15. Perhaps the most famous case standing for this proposition is Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker held that students could not
be prohibited from wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War without a showing that the
armbands would cause a substantial disruption of school activities. Id. at 504, 512-13. In affirming
that minor students had First Amendment rights, the Court said that "[i]t can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, for the proposition that "First Amendment rights, applied
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raises serious constitutional concerns when it incidentally denies adults
access to speech. 6
Beyond these central propositions, however, the constitutionality of
child-protection censorship remains largely a muddle. Legislators know
they have the power to censor speech but are unsure of the power's limits.
Courts know that this censorship can violate the First Amendment but are
unsure of when this occurs. The result is a time-consuming and elaborate
dance between legislators and judges as each searches for the undeclared
border between constitutional and unconstitutional child-protection
censorship. 17
This confusion is exacerbated by the fact that public pressure for childprotection censorship is on the rise. This growing concern is fueled by
in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to ...students")
(alteration in original); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 (1975) ("In most
circumstances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable when
government seeks to control the flow of information to minors.") (footnote call number omitted);
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that a public school
student could not be compelled to salute or pledge allegiance to the flag).
16. The first case to clearly establish this principle was Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,
383-84 (1957). Butler invalidated a Michigan statute that made it a crime to sell to the general
public literature that was inappropriate for minors. Id. at 383-84. Justice Frankfurter noted that the
"incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is
fit for children." Id. at 383. "Surely," he famously said, "this is to burn the house to roast the pig."
Id.Relying on Justice Frankfurter's language in Butler, the Court has subsequently invalidated
many child-protection censorship laws on the ground that the laws unduly burden adult's access
to speech. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium,Inc., 518 U.S. at 759-60; Sable
Communicationsof Cal., Inc., 492 U.S. at 128, 131; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 73, 75 (1983).
17. This confusion is reflected in the mixed results that child-protection censorship laws have
received in the courts. Compare Am. Library Ass 'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 214 (upholding Children's
Internet Protection Act), with Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 495
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (finding Children's Internet Protection Act unconstitutional), rev'd,539 U.S. 194
(2003); Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 585 (finding the Child Online Protection Act's reference to
contemporary "community standards" did not render the act unconstitutional), with ACLU v. Reno,
217 F.3d 162, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding the Child Online Protection Act's reference to
"contemporary community standards" did render it unconstitutional), rev 'dsubnom. Ashcroft, 535
U.S. 564 (2002); LorillardTobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 561-66 (finding regulation banning outdoor
advertising of certain tobacco products within one thousand feet of a school or playground
unconstitutional), with Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30,53 (1 st Cir. 2000) (finding same
regulation constitutional), rev'd in part sub nom. LorillardTobacco Co., 533 U.S. 525 (2001);
Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding
ordinance limiting minors' access to violent video games unconstitutional), with Interactive Digital
Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1141 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (finding
ordinance constitutional), rev'd, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v.
Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 573, 580 (7th Cir. 2001) (enjoining law that denied minors' access to
violent video-arcade games unless accompanied by a parent), with Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n
v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 981 (S.D. Ind.2000) (refusing to enjoin law), rev'd, 244 F.3d
572 (7th Cir. 2001).
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advances in technology that have enhanced the graphic quality of sexual
and violent images while expanding the means by which these images can
be disseminated. 8 These technological advances, combined with the
capitalist incentive to exploit the public's thirst for all things prurient and
violent (recall P. T. Barnum's observation that "No one ever went broke
underestimating the taste of the American public" 9 ), have produced an
explosion of sexual and violent materials that potentially are available to
minors. Consider just a few examples as well as some regulatory
responses:
Violent Video Games: Concern over violent video games
swelled after the massacres at Columbine High School in
Littleton, Colorado and Heath High School in West Paducah,
Kentucky. a° News reports revealed that the teen-age assailants
in both instances were avid fans of violent video games such
as Doom, Quake, and Mortal Kombat. a' One of the

18. See, e.g., YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET 21 (Dick Thornburgh & Hebert S.
Lin eds., 2002) (attributing the "[p]ublic concern and controversy" about sexual materials on the
Internet to the fact that "graphically depicted" sexual materials are easy to find, that these materials
are sometimes "more extreme than that which is easily available through non-Internet media," and
that "even the most graphic of these images can find their way onto children's computer screens
without being actively sought").
19. Michael Anthony, 2002 in Review: ClassicalMusic, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 29,
2002, at 1OF. Although this quote is frequently attributed to Barnum, it apparently derives from a
slightly different quote by H. L. Mencken: "'No one in this world, so far as I know... has ever lost
money by underestimating the intelligence of the great masses of the plain people."' Glenwood
Gibbs, Editorial, Free for All, Rough Estimate, Part II, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1993, at Al 7
(alteration in original) (quoting BARTLETT'S FAMIHAR QUOTATIONS (16th ed. Little, Brown & Co.
1992)). Similarly, it also has been claimed that Barnum did not say "there's a sucker born every
minute." Matthew Hoffrnan, Errors& Omissions:Next Time You Remember an OldAdage, Forget
It, INDEPENDENT (London), July 31, 2004, at 38. Instead, a rival said this when referring to one of
Barnum's exhibits. Id.
20. Clay Calvert, Violence, Video Games, and a Voice of Reason: Judge Posner to the
Defense of Kids' Culture and the FirstAmendment, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 21-23 (2002)
(discussing media coverage of the perpetrators' fondness for violent video games); see also Frank
Bruni, Senate Looks for Clues on Youth Violence, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1999, at A18 (discussing
post-Columbine Senate hearings about "the entertainment industry's marketing of violent fantasies
to children"). The article suggested that legislative responses to Columbine, in the form of gun
control or regulation of the media, seemed unlikely even shortly after the massacre. The article
noted that both Democrats and Republicans, each for their own reasons, might have a limited
appetite for new legislation. ("[J]ust as money from the National Rifle Association lines the pockets
of Republicans, money from the entertainment industry lines the pockets of Democrats.").
21. Calvert, supra note 20, at 21. For a more recent example of violent video games being
tied to youth violence, see Joseph A. Gambardello et al., Teens Accused of PlanningColumbineStyle Attack, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 7, 2003, which describes how three youths suspected of
planning a Columbine-style killing rampage called themselves "Warriors of Freedom," the name
of an Internet-based combat game.
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Columbine assailants even customized his "Doom" game to
simulate the crime he eventually committed. 2 Subsequent
efforts to limit minors' access to violent video games have
been notably unsuccessful. The Seventh Circuit enjoined an
Indianapolis ordinance, noting that children would be illprepared for adulthood if raised in an "intellectual bubble"
and comparing violent video games to "[c]lassic literature and
art." 23 The Eighth Circuit invalidated a St. Louis ordinance,
finding it inconsequential that modem technology "increased
viewer control" and commenting that "literature is most
successful when it 'draws the reader into 24the story ... [and]
makes him identify with the characters."'

Indecent and Violent Television Programming: Concerns
about indecency and violence on television are longstanding
and unlikely to disappear.2 ' A recent study by the Henry J.
Kaiser Family Foundation, for instance, found that one out of
seven television shows (excluding newscasts, sports, and
children's shows) "has at least one scene in which intercourse
is depicted or strongly implied. 26 Concern over violent and
indecent television programming has generated a wealth of
federal legislation. The FCC has long had authority to
22. Corinne E. Frantz & Rosemarie Scolaro Moser, Youth Violence and Victimization: An
Introduction, in

SHOCKING

VIOLENCE:

YOUTH

PERPETRATORS

AND

VICTIMS-A

MULTIDISCIPLINARYPERSPECTIVE 3,6 (Rosemarie Scolaro Moser & Corinne E. Frantz eds., 2000).

23. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 573, 575, 577, 580 (7th Cir.
2001).
24. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954,957 (8th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577); see also Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d
684, 687, 691 (8th Cir. 1992) (invalidating a Missouri statute restricting rental or sale of violent
videos to minors); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1183, 1190
(W.D. Wash. 2004) (finding a Washington law penalizing the distribution of violent video games
to minors unconstitutional). Private parties seeking to impose tort liability on the distributors of
violent video games have similarly found their actions barred by the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683,695-99 (6th Cir. 2002); Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc.,
198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 178-82 (D. Conn. 2002); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d
1264, 1279-82 (D. Colo. 2002).
25. See, e.g., Notice of Inquiry, Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children,
69 Fed. Reg. 49,899, 49,899 (July 28, 2004) (noting that violence on television "has been a matter
of private and governmental concern and discussion from at least the early 1950s" and citing to
numerous reports produced on the topic); Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating
Violence on Televsion, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1487, 1565 (1995); Joel Timmer, Incrementalismand
Policymakingon Television Violence, 9 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 351, 352-54 (2004) (reviewing history
of Congressional hearings on television violence from the 1950s through the present).
26. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SEX ON TV 3: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 (2003),

available at http://www.kff.org/entmedia/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security
/getfile.cfn&PagelD=14278; see also Alessandra Stanley, It's a Fact of Life: Prime-TimeShows
Are Getting Sexier, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at El.
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regulate indecency on broadcast television.27 Prompted by the
revealing Super Bowl half-time show in 2004, Congress
recently considered bills to dramatically increase the agency's
sanctioning power under its authority. 28 Congress also has
enacted more limited indecency regulations for cable
television, including a law designed to protect children from
signal "bleeding"-those fleeting moments when
inappropriate images on scrambled cable stations escape
unscrambled.2 9 Federal law also requires television
manufacturers to install "V-chips" on newly built televisions
so that parents can block inappropriate programming3 ° (even
though reports suggest that few parents are aware of the
technology3 ). These regulations have spawned protracted
litigation and several Supreme Court opinions.32
Indecency on the Internet: Public concern over unsuitable
materials on the Internet has helped to generate a series of
federal laws, which have themselves been the subject of
numerous legal challenges. Congress's first major foray into
the field was the Communications Decency Act of 1996,
which regulated the display and distribution of "indecent"

27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000); see also MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 233 (6th ed. 2000) (noting that federal authority to regulate the content over

radio and television broadcasts has existed since the enactment of the Communications Act of
1934). A landmark Supreme Court decision on the regulation of broadcast indecency is FCC v.
PacificaFoundation,438 U.S. 726, 729-30, 750-51 (1978), which upheld a FCC sanction against
Pacifica Foundation for broadcasting George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue. The District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals issued an important decision on the constitutionality of FCC
rules limiting the times when indecent materials could be broadcast. Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See generally Policy Statement, Industry
Guidance on the Commission's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies
Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 66 Fed. Reg. 21, 984 (Apr. 6, 2001) [hereinafter FCC Policy
Statement on Broadcast Indecency] (describing the Commission's enforcement policies regarding
broadcast indecency).
28. Jacques Steinberg, Move to Stiffen Decency Rules Is Losing Steam in Washington, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2004, at C I (stating that "the prospects for such a measure reaching President
Bush's desk before the November election appear far less assured than they did a few months ago").
The newly-elected House of Representatives passed a similar bill in February 2005. House Votes
to Raise Finesfor Indecency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2005, at C5.
29. 47 U.S.C. § 561 (2000). This law was found unconstitutional in United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000).
30. 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) (2000).
31. See, e.g., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PARENTS AND THE V-Cftt 2001: A
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION SURVEY 1 (2001), availableat http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/

13848 l.pdf ("Of all parents who have a V-Chip, half (53%) don't know it .
) (emphasis
omitted).
32. See, e.g., PlayboyEntm"t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 806; Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1996); PacificaFound., 438 U.S. at 729, 731 nn.3-4.
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materials to minors.33 The Supreme Court invalidated this Act
because of its vague terms and failure to use the least
restrictive means to accomplish the government's purpose.34
Congress responded two years later with a more carefully
drawn law, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA).
Despite this effort, a lower court enjoined the Act's
enforcement,36 and the Supreme Court affirmed this holding
in June 2004. 37 The Supreme Court remanded the case for
trial but left a strong impression that the government's
prospects for success were bleak.38 Congress had slightly
more success with the Children's Internet Protection Act
(CIPA),39 which denies federal funds to public libraries that
fail to place filters on their publicly-accessible computers.4 °
The Supreme Court upheld this Act against a facial challenge
at the end of its 2002 term;41 however, two Justices in the
to bring a
five-Justice majority invited the law's opponents
42
subsequent challenge to the law "as-applied.,
As the above discussion suggests, public concern about minors' access
to inappropriate materials has led to an onslaught of regulatory responses
and a multitude of judicial decisions evaluating those responses. This
wealth of precedent has added considerable bulk to free speech/childprotection jurisprudence but very little in terms of clarity; a scholar poring

33. Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560-61 (2000)).
34. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870-72, 879 (1997).
35. Child Online Protection Act (COPA), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000)).
36. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473,476, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1999), affd, 217 F.3d 162 (3d
Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S.Ct. 2783 (2004).
37. Ashcroft, 124 S.Ct. at 2795.
38. See id. at 2794-95; Linda Greenhouse, Court, 5-4, Blocks a Law Regulating Internet
Access,N.Y. TIMES, June 30,2004, atA1 (stating that the Court's opinion "suggested strongly" that
the government would be unsuccessful at trial).
39. Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000)
(codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of the United States Code).
40. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f) (2001).
41. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003).
42. Id. at 215 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see id. at 218-19 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
Congress has taken other actions to help protect children from inappropriate materials on the
Internet. It passed an act prohibiting the use of misleading domain names, Prosecutorial Remedies
and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT ACT), Pub. L. No.
108-21, § 521, 117 Stat. 650, 686 codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252B (Supp. 2004)), and it created a
"Dot Kids" second-level Internet domain for content that was appropriate for minors under the age
of thirteen, Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 197-317, § 2, 116
Stat. 2766, 2766 (codified at 47 U.S.C § 941 (Supp. 2004)).
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over the jurisprudence still could have a hard time articulating what
legislators may or may not do to protect minors from speech.
In this Article, I try to guide legislators and judges through the thicket
of child-protection censorship. I cut through the masses of precedent,
empirical studies, and scholarship to distill the child-protection/free speech
conflict into a set of comprehensible questions.43 I hope that by identifying
the questions underlying the conflict, I can draw attention to the key
constitutional and policy choices at stake whenever speech is suppressed
to protect children. This will help policymakers focus on the real questions
behind child-protection censorship: namely, who should decide whether
child-protection censorship is constitutional and how should they make this
decision? I hope that this conceptual roadmap also will help change the
tenor of the child-protection censorship debate, which too often is phrased
in extreme terms-either that government censorship to protect children
should never be trusted because it is always ill-founded and heavy-handed,
or that government censorship to protect children must be given great
deference lest our society plunge into moral decay."
43. There has been a burst of scholarship on child-protection censorship in the last few years.
Two of the most important works are books by Kevin Saunders and Marjorie Heins. Saunders
contends that the First Amendment should permit greater regulation of children's access to speech.
KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROMTHE FIRST AMENDMENT 2-3 (2003). Heins takes
the opposite stance. HEINS, supra note 6, at 11 (stating that censorship should extend only to
information that results in "real, not just symbolic, harm" to children). There also has been a recent
symposium on child-protection censorship organized by Amitai Etzioni. Symposium, Do Children
Have the Same First Amendment Rights as Adults?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2004). Some
important earlier works on child-protection censorship include Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes:
Examining the State's Interest in Protecting Childrenfrom ControversialSpeech, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 427 (2000), which examines the validity of the compelling interests most frequently cited by
government actors, and Eugene Volokh, FreedomofSpeech, Shielding Children,and Transcending
Balancing, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 141, which analyzes the Supreme Court's logic in Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997). Many other helpful articles on the constitutionality of specific childprotection censorship laws are cited throughout this Article.
The scholarship mentioned above discusses much of the relevant empirical evidence on the
impact of violent and sexual speech. See, e.g., HEINS, supra note 6, at 228-53; SAUNDERS, supra,
at 43-66. There are also recent governmental and privately sponsored reports surveying this
evidence. See, e.g.,YouTH, PORNOGRAPHY, ANDTHE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 143-60 (surveying
research on the impact of exposure to sexually-explicit material); COMM'N ON CHILD PROT.
(COPA), REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000) (evaluating the accessibility, cost, and effectiveness of
child-protective technologies and methods), available at http://www.copacommission.org/
report/COPAreport.pdf; THOMAS BLILEY, CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 105-775,
at 10- 11 (1998), reprintedin 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 736 (discussing evidence indicating that exposure
to sexually-explicit material harms children).
44. Compare HEINS, supra note 6, at 257 ("Censorship is an avoidance technique that
addresses adult anxieties and satisfies symbolic concerns, but ultimately does nothing to resolve
social problems or affirmatively help adolescents and children cope with their environments and
impulses or navigate the dense and insistent media barrage that surrounds them."), with SAUNDERS,
supra note 43, at 1-2. Saunders states:
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The Article addresses a series of questions that together comprise a
methodology for analyzing child-protection censorship. Part II beginsthe
analysis by establishing a procedural framework for evaluating childprotection censorship. It asks the fundamental questions of who should
decide whether child-protection censorship is constitutional and how the
decision on the law's constitutionality should be made. These questions
concern the propriety ofjudicial review in the context of child-protection
censorship and wrestle with the elusive question of how judicial power can
be exercised in a restrained and consistent fashion.
Part I explores the substantive question of whether child-protection
censorship should ever be constitutional. It begins by showing how childprotection censorship is at odds with the First Amendment's general
prohibition on censorship. It then considers the arguments for exempting
child-protection censorship from this prohibition. As will be seen, the
primary argument for permitting child-protection censorship is the
perception that children are different from adults and that these differences
justify governmental intervention to protect children from speech. Part III
works through each step in this argument. It also addresses the practical
problems of converting a theoretical justification for child-protection
censorship into a functional standard for determining when childprotection censorship is constitutional.
Part IV assumes that courts will tolerate at least some forms of childprotection censorship. It wrestles with the sensitive question of how courts
can keep child-protection censorship within tolerable limits. Such
censorship triggers traditional First Amendment concerns about
overbreadth and vagueness, and Part IV considers how courts can address
these issues to provide legislators with guidance when they enact new
legislation.
II. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: WHO SHOULD DECIDE WHETHER
CHILD-PROTECTION CENSORSHIP IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND How
SHOULD THIS DECISION BE MADE?

This Part lays out the procedural groundwork for later substantive
discussions about the legitimacy of child-protection censorship. It
considers the related questions of who should decide whether child-

[H]ow better for a society to commit suicide than to fail in its duty to raise its
youth in a safe and psychologically healthy manner.... We are failing in our duty
to society and its coming generations, and the First Amendment's limitations on
our ability to restrict the influences children face are among the roots of that
failure.
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protection censorship is constitutional and how this decisionmaker can
exercise its discretion in a restrained and disciplined manner.
Of course, the answers to these questions may seem obvious. The
Supreme Court, after all, is the arbiter of First Amendment meaning and
therefore the logical candidate to rule on child-protection censorship's
constitutionality. The Court also has a predictable means for making this
determination: Because child-protection censorship regulates speech based
on content, the Court should apply a "strict scrutiny" analysis that
invalidates a law unless it serves a "compelling" governmental interest
and
45
uses the "least speech-restrictive means" to further that interest.
While these choices may seem self-evident, they are not the only ones
available. Just because the Supreme Court has the final say on the
Constitution's meaning does not mean it must always exercise that power.
Indeed, there are many areas of constitutional law in which the Court
defers to the other political branches by giving their actions little or no
review.' Similarly, even if the Court chooses to apply strict scrutiny to
child-protection censorship, it still would need to develop a process for
deciding when a governmental interest is compelling and how much
censorship that interest would justify. These issues are considered below.
A. Who Should Decide Whether Child-ProtectionCensorship
Is Constitutional?
The Supreme Court reigns supreme in the area of constitutional
interpretation. As Justice Marshall announced in Marbury v. Madison, the
' But the fact that the Court
Court has the power "to say what the law is."47
has this power does not mean it must use it. Indeed, there are many areas
of constitutional jurisprudence in which the Court forgoes its power to
review laws and instead defers to the political branches. Economic
regulations, for example, receive virtually no scrutiny under the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clauses. 48 The Court instead applies a "rational
45. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (stating that the
government may "regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest"). The
Supreme Court also sometimes includes a requirement that a law be "narrowly tailored" to serve
the government's interest. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
§ 4:2 (2004). The narrowly tailored requirement, like the least restrictive means requirement,
ensures that content-based regulations do not burden more speech than is necessary to accomplish
the government's purpose. See, e.g., id. § 4:21 (equating the narrowly tailored and least restrictive
means requirements).
46. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
48. See, e.g., United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980) (noting that the
Court, "in cases involving social and economic benefits has consistently refused to invalidate on
equal protection grounds legislation which it simply deemed unwise or unartfully drawn");
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relationship" test that is really no test at all but rather a statement of
judicial restraint.49 Similarly, for almost sixty years, the Court used a
deferential approach when reviewing "federalism" issues such as limits on
Congress's powers.5"
Whether the Court aggressively scrutinizes legislation or gives it a "free
pass" depends upon how the Court chooses to exercise its power ofjudicial
review. When the Court uses its power aggressively, it allocates to itself
the right to decide which laws will pass constitutional muster. When the
Court applies no scrutiny, it effectively allows legislators to decide what
the Constitution permits. Of course, the Court is always free to re-assert its
power, as it has recently done with federalism issues, but until it chooses
to do so, its deference leaves legislators the authority to decide on the
limits of their own power.
What, then, should the Court do with regard to child-protection
censorship? Should it aggressively scrutinize laws limiting child access to
speech, or should it defer to legislative judgments by applying little or no
scrutiny? At first blush, one would expect the Court to subject these laws
to close scrutiny because child-protection censorship regulates speech
based on content and such regulations typically face strict scrutiny.5 This
rigorous scrutiny reflects the Court's leeriness of content-based laws,
which the Court sees as a potential tool for government censorship. As
Justice Scalia noted in Hill v. Colorado, "[t]he vice of content-based
legislation-what renders it deserving of the high standard of strict

Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n, 539 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2003).
49. See JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 10 (5th ed. 2002)

(noting that the "rational relationship test . . . still limits all legislation, but since 1937 its
application has been tantamount to finding legislation constitutional; the court has found virtually
any proposed reason sufficient to sustain a statute"); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.2.3, at 604 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that "since
1937, not one law has been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as violating economic
substantive due process"). A classic example of this deferential approach is Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (stating that "[t]he day is gone when this
Court uses the Due Process Clause ... to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out ofharmony with a particular
school of thought").
50. The Court did not invalidate a single federal law from 1936 until 1994 on grounds that
the law exceeded Congress's commerce power. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 49, § 3.3.5, at 260. The
legal community was surprised by the Court's recent interest in federalism issues only because the
Court had applied so little scrutiny to these issues for so long. See Russell L. Weaver, Lopez and
the Federalizationof CriminalLaw, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 815, 819 (1996) (noting how the Supreme
Court's 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), "set off a storm of
controversy").
51. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (stating that the Supreme
Court's"precedents... apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage,
or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content").
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scrutiny-is not that it is always used for invidious, thought-control
purposes, but that it lends itself to use for those purposes."52
Yet arguments can be made for the Court to use a more deferential
approach when reviewing child-protection censorship. One could argue,
for instance, that child-protection censorship is different from other
content-based regulations because only minors are denied access to
speech. 53 Because adults still have access to the censored ideas, the threat
to First Amendment interests is arguably reduced and the need for active
judicial review largely mitigated. The Court could similarly conclude that
democratic self-governance includes the right of the adult population to
control the speech environment in which its children are reared. Judicial
deference would signal the Court's recognition that this type of speech
regulation is appropriately left to the discretion of the people's elected
representatives.
Proponents of child-protection censorship use such logic to argue for
more relaxed judicial review. Kevin Saunders, who passionately argues for
more child-protection censorship in his book, Saving Our Childrenfrom
the First Amendment, methodically explains how child-protection
censorship is compatible with free speech values.54 He argues, for example,
that child-protection censorship does not undermine the First
Amendment's role in facilitating self-governance because children are not
participants in self-government:
The importance of free speech to self-government is that
those who are to make the decisions have all the information
and will be able to convince each other of the wisest course.
Children are not among those who make the decisions, so it
is at least questionable how strongly the First Amendment, at
least on this justification, applies to children.55

52. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 743 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 794 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted)).
53. This argument would be inapplicable if a child-protection censorship law also denied
adults access to speech. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564-65 (2001)
(stating that a ban on outdoor advertising of tobacco products also affects adults' access to speech);
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (stating that a regulation of indecency on the Internet
also affects adults' access to speech); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
127 (1989) (stating that a ban on indecent commercial telephone communications limits both
adults' and minors' access to speech). Indeed, a common reason for invalidating child-protection
censorship laws is because they "bum the house to roast the pig" by "reduc[ing] the adult
population" to hearing "only what is fit for children." Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383
(1957); see supra note 16. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Part IV. See infra Part
IV.C.
54. See generally SAUNDERS, supra note 43.
55. Id. at21.
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Similarly, he argues that children play a less important role than adults
in the truth-seeking process of the marketplace of ideas56 and that limiting
children's access to speech is unlikely to lead to civil unrest. 7 In making
these arguments, Saunders hopes to allay concerns that child-protection
censorship will undermine First Amendment values. If he can convince
judges that the censorship is not a threat to the First Amendment, they will
be more likely to uphold the legislation.
These arguments certainly have merit. Surely it is more important for
self-governance that those who vote have information than those who do
not. But even if these arguments establish that adults have a greater claim
to First Amendment rights than children, they do not establish that minors
lack free speech rights altogether. Indeed, logic leads to the opposite
conclusion. The fact that children do not vote, for example, could hardly
imply that the government is free to deny them access to current political
discourse. As Judge Posner rightly observed, "[n]ow that eighteen-yearolds have the right to vote, it is obvious that they must be allowed the
freedom to form their political views ... before they turn eighteen, so that
their minds are not a blank when they first exercise the franchise."58
Likewise, even if minors play a lesser role in the process of truth-seeking
(putting aside the story of The Emperor'sNew Clothes59), it controverts
basic First Amendment principles to suggest that their ideas are not
welcome in a marketplace where "there is no such thing as a false idea."6
This point is perhaps made most clearly, however, when one realizes that
if children lacked free speech rights, the government could deny them
access to virtually anything, including information about socialism,
atheism, homosexuality, or abortion. Critics ofchild-protection censorship
are quick to highlight this "not insignificant question of minors' First
Amendment rights": 6 '
This is not some fuzzy, ivory-tower abstraction. Youngsters
need access to information and ideas, not indoctrination and
ignorance of controversy, precisely because they are in the
process of identity formation. They are also in the process of
becoming functioning adults in a democratic society and, as

56. Id. at 31 (stating that, on "issues of politics and public policy ... minors are unlikely to
serve as the test of, or make the contribution to, the truth that [John Stuart] Mill envision[ed]" in
his marketplace-of-ideas metaphor).
57. Id. at 35 (noting that "[t]he likelihood of a rebellion by youths deprived of the ability to
attend 'R'-rated films seems remote").
58. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
59. See generally HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES (Houghton
Mifflin 2002) (1837).
60. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
61. HEINS, supra note 6, at 258.
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the Supreme Court has pointed out, this is not so easy to do if
they are shielded from dangerous or disturbing ideas until
they are 18.62
These arguments for children's First Amendment rights are sufficiently
compelling that even proponents of child-protection censorship concede
this point. They do not argue that children lack First Amendment rights but
only that they have "weaker" rights than adults.63 Saunders readily admits
that mature minors must hear and participate in current political discourse
if they are going to be prepared for their adult civic obligations. 64 He
borrows John Garvey's metaphor of minors as adults in "spring training"
and Franklin Zimring's description of them as operating with a rights
"learner's permit."65 The communitarian scholar Amitai Etzioni, who also
supports censorship to protect children, similarly concedes that6
"[p]ractically no one would argue that minors have no free speech rights.1
The difference between proponents and critics of child-protection
censorship, then, is one of degree rather than of kind. All accept that
children have judicially enforceable free speech rights (surely the
government cannot deny them access to information about evolution or the
Republican party platform). Proponents merely think that children have
weaker First Amendment rights than adults and that this difference justifies
more governmental control of their access to information.
Supreme Court jurisprudence accords with this position. The Court
acknowledges that minors have First Amendment rights and has not shied
away from enforcing those rights. While the early decision, Ginsberg v.
New York, suggested that child-protection censorship would receive only
rational basis review,67 more recent decisions establish that such censorship
will receive close judicial scrutiny.68

62. Id.
63. SAUNDERS, supra note 43, at 38 (stating that "the [First Amendment] interests of children
are not as great" as adults and that, consequently, "society should be able to impose limitations that
would be unacceptable interferences with adult communication").
64. Id. at 23 (noting that "[i]t would be for the good of society for these soon-to-be
participants to learn how to participate" in self-government).
65. Id. (citing JOHN H. GARvEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 106-11 (1996); FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 89-98 (1982)).
66. Amitai Etzioni, On ProtectingChildrenfrom Speech, 79 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 3,42 (2004).
67. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631, 643 (1968) (upholding a New York law
designed to protect minors by stating that the Court "cannot say that [the law].., has no rational
relation to the objective of safeguarding such minors from harm").
68. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (finding that a
federal regulation that protected children from inadequately scrambled indecent programs was a
"content-based speech restriction" that could "stand only if it satisfie[d] strict scrutiny"); Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); see also Steven D. Hinckley, Your
Money or Your Speech: The Children's Internet ProtectionAct and the CongressionalAssault on
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The Court's willingness to scrutinize child-protection censorship does
not imply its rejection of the more deferential scrutiny advanced by
censorship proponents. The Court, in fact, appears to have adopted this
approach. While it uses strict scrutiny to evaluate child-protection
censorship, it also acknowledges that the censorship serves a compelling
governmental interest.69 The Court has thus signaled, in the parlance of
strict scrutiny analysis, that it is more likely to uphold child-protection
censorship than censorship aimed at adults.
B. How Should the Decision to Permit Child-Protection
CensorshipBe Made?
Because all sides agree that judges should have the final say on the
constitutionality of child-protection censorship, the analysis can shift from
who should make this decision to how this decision should be made.
Precedent again suggests an obvious answer. Because child-protection
censorship regulates speech based on content, courts should evaluate the
law using strict scrutiny. Regulations should be upheld only if they serve
a compelling governmental interest and use the least restrictive means to
further that governmental interest.7"
Here too, however, the black letter principle may only obfuscate the
analysis rather than clarify it. This would not be the case if strict scrutiny
were always "fatal in fact," as it typically is with adult censorship.71 But the
Supreme Court has indicated that child-protection censorship serves a

the FirstAmendment in PublicLibraries,80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1025, 1045 (2002).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194,215 (2003) (stating that
"[t]he interest in protecting young library users from material inappropriate for minors is legitimate,
and even compelling, as all Members of the Court appear to agree"); Denver Area Educ.
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 743 (1996) (stating that "the provision before
us comes accompanied with an extremely important justification, one that this Court has often
found compelling-the need to protect children from exposure to patently offensive sex-related
material"); Sable CommunicationsofCal., Inc., 492 U.S. at 126 (recognizing "a compelling interest
in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors" and that this "extends to
shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards").
70. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc., 492 U.S. at 126 (stating that the government may
"regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest
if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest").
71. Censorship intended to protect adults from "bad" or "harmful" ideas is virtually never
sustained unless it concerns an area of unprotected speech like obscenity. See, e.g., Police Dep't
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (stating that, "above all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content"). Content-based restrictions are occasionally sustained when they serve a purpose
beyond just protecting adults from "bad" ideas. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211
(1992) (upholding a prohibition on solicitation within one hundred feet of a polling place to ensure
that elections are "free from the taint of intimidation and fraud").
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compelling interest and can survive strict scrutiny.72 Courts, therefore,
cannot rely on this requirement to provide a simple mechanism for
weeding out the chaff of unlawful child-protection censorship from the
wheat of permissible constitutional regulation.73
If the requirement of a compelling interest does not solve the problem
of determining when child-protection censorship is constitutional, then
perhaps the least restrictive means requirement can. This principle focuses
on the means the government uses to regulate. Assuming the end
(censoring speech to protect children) is legitimate, it ensures that the
government does not suppress more speech than is necessary to accomplish
its end. 4 The principle, which is also expressed as the requirement that a
law be narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest, 75 embodies a
zero-tolerance policy for gratuitous suppression of speech.
In practice, this requirement has proven to be an effective tool for
resolving child-protection censorship cases. Many invalidated censorship
laws have been poorly drafted and clearly suppressed more speech than
was necessary for the government's purpose. A recurring problem has been
laws that deny adults access to speech when it was possible to deny access
only to minors.76 Such gratuitous interferences with adults' rights have
virtually guaranteed a law's unconstitutionality. 77 As Justice Frankfurter

72. See supra note 14.
73. Similar challenges have arisen in other areas of constitutional law where strict scrutiny
does not ensure a particular outcome. Analysis of race-based classifications in the equal protection
context, for instance, was simple as long as the strict scrutiny applied to these "suspect"
classifications guaranteed their unconstitutionality. But once the Court recognized that the strict
scrutiny was not necessarily fatal, see, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237
(1995) (intending to specifically "dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal
in fact') (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment)), and that race-based classifications could be used to remedy past discrimination, id., or
to promote diversity, see, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978)
(plurality opinion); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-34 (2003), the Court's jurisprudence
became muddled as the Court struggled to explain when these exceptional uses were permissible.
74. As the Court said in its recent decision concerning the Child Online Protection Act, "[t]he
purpose ofthe test is to ensure that speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the goal,
for it is important to assure that legitimate speech is not chilled or punished." Ashcroft v. ACLU,
124 S.Ct. 2783, 2791 (2004).
75. Id. at 2790.
76. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,131 (1989) (finding
a law banning indecent commercial telephone calls unconstitutional because it was possible, using
technological means, to prevent minors from accessing the calls while still permitting adults access).
77. Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2791. The Court stated that a "statute that 'effectively suppresses
a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one
another ... is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving
the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997)); see Denver Area Educ. Telecomms Consortium, Inc.
v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759-60 (1996); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc., 492 U.S. at 128-29;
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7
famously observed, these laws "burn the house to roast the pig. ' 'T
Laws also have been problematic because they used vague or overbroad
language to define the speech being regulated. 79 Although these doctrines
are conceptually distinct from the least resrictive means requirement, they
too concern regulatory means that unnecessarily suppress or chill speech.
Litigants challenging child-protection censorship laws often invoke the
doctrines of vagueness or overbreadth. Their common refrain is that the
laws ban not only pornographic speech but also speech about AIDS, breast
cancer, and famous works of art."° Majorie Heins's recent book, Not in
Front of the Children: "Indecency," Censorship, and the Innocence of
Youth, visually captures this argument by placing a Renaissance painting
with "parental advisory" labels over the purportedly indecent
on its 8cover
1
parts.
When laws so gratuitously suppress speech, they invite judicial
invalidation. Legislators are placing fish in a barrel forjudges to shoot. But
these criteria-least restrictive means, overbreadth, and vagueness-easily
resolve cases only when legislators clearly overreach. As legislators
become more adept at crafting legislation with precision, these doctrines
will no longer provide a simple means of identifying unconstitutional
child-protection censorship.
Once legislators eliminate these obvious grounds for invalidation,
judges will face the purer question of when child-protection censorship
should be allowed. Because the requirements of a compelling interest or
the least restrictive means will not provide judges with ready-made

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983).
78. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
79. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 (finding that the "vague contours" of the speech being regulated
by the Communications Decency Act was a basis for finding the Act unconstitutional); Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 (1975) (stating that a city ordinance "intended to regulate
expression accessible to minors ... is overbroad in its proscription").
80. The plaintiffs challenging the Communications Decency Act, for instance, claimed that
the Act would suppress a wide range of communications about sexual subjects. HEINS, supra note
6, at 159. Marjorie Heins describes some of the groups involved in the litigation and the speech
they were trying to protect:
Among them were the ACLU, which hosted a discussion of masturbation after
Joycelyn Elders was fired as Surgeon General for mentioning the subject; Human
Rights Watch, which offered sometimes graphic descriptions of sexual torture and
rape; Planned Parenthood, the Safer Sex Web Page ... and the Critical Path AIDS
Project, all of which provided explicit descriptions of contraception and safer sex;
and Wildcat Press, which published an online magazine for gay and lesbian teens.
Id.
81. HEINS, supra note 6. The cover painting is Danae by Correggio. Id.
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answers, 82 courts will have little choice but to wade into the broader debate
about child-protection censorship's legitimacy. As they enter these waters,
they will soon discover that there are no clear answers but only shades of
opinion that vary with how the legislation's costs and benefits are assessed.
Critics of child-protection censorship will tell judges that the laws
impose severe costs on free speech rights. Their arguments will be
strongest when the laws also deny adults access to speech, 83 but they will
argue that the laws are problematic even when only minors are affected.
They may say that the laws are vague or overbroad and consequently deny
minors access to important protected speech (Renaissance paintings or
AIDS awareness websites).84 But even if the laws target only crass, violent,
or sexual images, they still will say the laws are unconstitutional. Their
arguments may vary, but certain themes will tend to predominate: (1)
government censorship is always worse than any harm from speech;85 (2)
minors will not be prepared for the adult marketplace of ideas if they are
sheltered from "bad" ideas in their youth; 86 (3) suppressing speech only
increases minors' determination to access it (which they will inevitably
succeed in doing);87 (4) even offensive speech includes important ideas (for
example, sexual speech can help minors explore their sexuality, and
violent images can have the "cathartic" effect of making people less likely
to commit actual violence);88 (5) it is impossible to draft censorship laws
without vagueness and overbreadth problems and thus the laws will always
chill protected speech; 89 and (6) history teaches that government efforts to
82. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
84. See HEINS, supra note 6, at 159; supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., HEINS, supra note 6, at 257 (stating that censorship "frustrates rather than
enhances young people's mental agility and capacity to deal with the world ....[and] inhibits
straightforward discussion about sex" and through modeling can teach minors "authoritarianism,
intolerance for unpopular opinions, erotophobia, and sexual guilt").
86. See, e.g., id. at 12 (stating that minors "need access to information and ideas precisely
because they are in the process [sic] becoming functioning members of society and cannot really
do so if they are kept in ideological blinders until they are 18").
87. See, e.g., id. (referring to the "titillation" caused by "forbidden speech zones").
88. See, e.g., id. at 10 (stating that there was "too much real aesthetic experience over
centuries" to dismiss the notion that exposure to sexual or violent materials "can sometimes reduce
rather than heighten human anxieties or aggression").
89. See, e.g., id. at 257-58. Heins states:
The recurring efforts to purge masterworks like HuckleberryFinn or I Know Why
the CagedBirdSings from American classrooms suggest that bad ideas are not so
easy to identify in the arts and entertainment, and that neither pressure groups nor
government officials are well qualified to make these literary and pedagogical
distinctions.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

21

Florida Law Review,
Vol.LAW
57, REVIEW
Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 2
FLORIDA

[Vol. 57

protect children from speech are misguided and inevitably suppress
valuable speech (citing a long list of horror stories about efforts to suppress
the works of D.H. Lawrence, Henry Miller, and James Joyce). 90
Critics similarly will tell judges that the benefits of child-protection
censorship are illusory. They will dismiss empirical claims that violent or
sexual speech "causes" inappropriate behavior9" and will claim that, even
if any detrimental effect exists, it is minimal compared to other factors
such as parental neglect, poor schools, poverty, crime, and drug and
alcohol abuse.92 They will argue that government censorship usurps the
role of parents who should decide what their children may hear and see.9 3
They will claim that any problems associated with speech should be
addressed either by media literacy programs that make children better
consumers of speech or by programs that facilitate parental control.94
Proponents of child-protection censorship will offer judges a starkly
different picture. They will point to a litany of social ills attributable to
inappropriate speech: increases in underage sex, teenage pregnancy, violent
crime, smoking, drug and alcohol abuse, and a general corrosion of the
societal fabric. 95 They will acknowledge that other factors influence these
trends but will claim that critics underestimate speech's deleterious
influence. 96 Proponents will concede that past efforts to regulate speech
have been misguided but will claim that the solution is not to forbid all

90. See, e.g., id. at 14-59 (discussing more than a century of overreaching government
censorship done in the name of protecting youth); Ross, supra note 43, at 442-46 (discussing
abusive censorship to protect children).
91. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 43, at 504 (stating that "it is nearly impossible to find an iota
of evidence that controversial speech about sex harms children").
92. See, e.g., HEINS, supra note 6, at 10-11 (stating that belief in a causal connection between
speech and antisocial behavior ignores "much more significant factors, from genetic predisposition
to family and community environment, that influence child and adolescent development"); Am.
Civil Liberties Union, Reply Comments in the Matter of Industry Proposalfor Rating Video
Programming(May 8, 1997) (on file with author) (stating that "the effects of art and entertainment
on human beings are more various, complex, and idiosyncratic than some political leaders or social
scientists would suggest").
93. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 43, at 521 (arguing that child-protection censorship in the
name of supporting "parental authority often clashes with principles of family autonomy and
cultural pluralism that are central to the Constitution").
94. See, e.g., HEINS, supra note 6, at 260-61 (describing specific media literacy programs that
the author believes are a constructive alternative to censorship).
95. Kevin Saunders's book begins with just such a litany of social ills. SAUNDERS, supranote
43, at 1 (stating that "[hiomicide is the second leading cause of death for fifteen- to twenty-fouryear-olds," that teenage pregnancy rates in 1998 were "too high" at "41.5 births per thousand"
unwed mothers between fifteen- and nineteen-years-old, that "5 million children are current
smokers," and that "10 million American teenagers drink monthly").
96. Etzioni, supra note 66, at 34 (rebutting the civil libertarian argument that "exposure to
cultural materials causes no discernable harm" by pointing to the "considerable ... consensus
among those who have studied the matter that significant harm is caused").
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censorship but to insist that it be narrowly tailored.97 They will tell judges
that failing to permit child-protection censorship will undermine the First
Amendment because it will erode the public's commitment to free speech
rights.9"
Like the critics, proponents will acknowledge that parents must play a
critical role in monitoring their children's access to speech, but they will
claim that parents cannot fulfill this role without government support. 99
They will claim that it is impossible for parents to monitor their children's
access to speech when violent and sexual images pervade the media. 100
They will claim that censorship facilitates parental choice by limiting
children's access to inappropriate materials while allowing parents to
obtain the materials and share them with their children.' 01
What are judges to do with these claims? They do not have the luxury
of being spectators to the debate. Instead, they must choose sides so that
they can resolve concrete disputes about actual censorship regimes. Cynics,
of course, might say that there is no principled way to make this choice and
that judges will choose based on their personal preference-whether it be
their political persuasion or their attitude toward free speech-or on more
discrete criteria such as whether they believe the media have corrupted
their children or grandchildren. Judges might respond that their choices
will be based upon "reasoned
judgment" applied to the principles
02
Constitution.
the
in
embodied
97. See SAUNDERS, supra note 43, at 135-39 (discussing the "[h]istory of [a]buse" in
obscenity prosecutions and ultimately arguing in favor of eliminating the obscenity exception for
adults while continuing to allow censorship designed to protect children).
98. See, e.g., id. at 73 (arguing that the public's respect for core First Amendment values will
be eroded if the Amendment is "seen as protecting the exposure of children to ... objectionable
material").
99. See, e.g., id. at 91-95 (acknowledging that parents have the "[p]rimary responsibility" for
inculcating children with values, but that the state also has an interest in supporting parents).
100. See, e.g., id. at 93-94 (acknowledging that supervision of children "'may best be left to
their parents,"' but also that "'parental control or guidance cannot always be provided"') (quoting
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (quoting People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334
(N.Y. 1965) (Fuld, J., concurring))).
101. See, e.g., id. at 40-41, 94 (suggesting that parents should have broad authority to decide
what materials their children may see, "even when the government believes that this material may
be inappropriate for consumption by children," but that the government should be allowed to
prevent third parties from subverting parental control by exposing children to inappropriate
materials without parents' consent).
102. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (describing judicial
discretion as controlled through the exercise of "reasoned judgment"). Justice Stevens recently
acknowledged the tension between his obligations as a judge and his personal preferences as a
parent and grandparent:
To be sure, our cases have recognized a compelling interest in protecting minors
from exposure to sexually explicit materials. As a parent, grandparent, and great-
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Perhaps the most attractive way out of this dilemma is for judges to
make their decisions based upon empirical evidence. The child-protection
censorship debate, after all, is rife with empirical assumptions. Whether
violent or sexual speech is harmful to children is an empirical question.
Whether parents can protect their children from speech is an empirical
question. Whether children can easily access speech is an empirical
question, and whether educational programs can counteract speech is an
empirical question. Social scientists have produced reams of literature on
these topics.1 °3 The question is whether courts should rely on this data as
the basis for their decisionmaking."
On the surface, this use of empirical data seems like an attractive way
to avoid the appearance of judicial arbitrariness. Decisions will be based
not on a judge's personal preferences, but rather on "neutral" or
"scientific" data. The Supreme Court also has used empirical evidence to
resolve a variety of constitutional disputes.0 5 Professors John Monahan
and Laurens Walker collect examples of such uses in their textbook, Social

grandparent, I endorse that goal without reservation. As a judge, however, I must
confess to a growing sense of unease when the interest in protecting children from
prurient materials is invoked as a justification for using criminal regulation of
speech as a substitute for, or a simple backup to, adult oversight of children's
viewing habits.
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2796-97 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
103. See supra note 43 for sources of recent empirical studies.
104. Judicial use of social science evidence traces back to the early part of the twentieth
century when judges and scholars began to reject the "classical" model of jurisprudence that was
"dominated by the belief that a single, correct legal solution could be reached in every case by the
application of rules of logic to a set of natural and self-evident principles." MONAHAN & WALKER,
supra note 49, at 1. Led by Holmes, Brandeis, and Pound, scholars began arguing that lawmaking
involved public policy choices and not just deductive logic (as Holmes said in The Common Law:
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."). Id. at 2 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, Jr., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Belknap Press 1963) (1881)). These scholars also believed that
social science evidence could help inform public policy decisions, which Brandeis illustrated with
his successful social-science-laden briefs. Id.
This "sociological jurisprudence" laid the groundwork for the subsequent legal realist
movement. Id. at 14. Monahan and Walker, in describing this evolution, note that the sociological
jurisprudes "maintained a core belief in traditional principles and moral values," whereas the
realists "discounted the worth of many traditional values and expressed a preference for pragmatic
experimentation." Id. at 15. The realists, influenced by John Dewey's belief that social sciences
could be applied to social problems, became interested in the connection between social science and
the law. Id. at 19. Yale Law School became a center for the study of law and the social sciences
during the deanship of Robert Hutchins, whose tenure as dean began in 1927. Id.
105. Id. at 185-320. When courts are making factual determinations for purposes of creating
law or policy, they are creating "legislative facts." Id. at 181. This is in contrast to "adjudicative
facts," which are factual determinations that are relevant only to the litigants in a particular dispute.
Id. at 93. These terms were coined by Kenneth Culp Davis but are now widely recognized. Id. at
93, 181.
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Science in Law. 106 These examples run the gamut from equal protection
cases about school desegregation to criminal procedure cases about the
constitutionality of smaller juries or the bias of death-qualified jurors.'0 7
The Court also frequently considers empirical evidence in its First
Amendment jurisprudence. In 44 Liquornart,Inc. v. Rhode Island,10 8 for
instance, the Court invalidated a ban on liquor price advertising because
the State had failed to provide empirical evidence that "the price
advertising ban will significantly advance the State's interest in promoting
temperance.""1 9 More recently, in Bartnicki v. Vopper," the Court barred
application of a wiretap law to defendants who had disclosed, but not
intercepted, a cell phone conversation because there was "no empirical
evidence to support" the claim that holding a disclosing party liable would
reduce the number of illegal interceptions."'
At the same time, the Supreme Court's use of empirical evidence in
constitutional adjudications has generated considerable controversy.
Commentators, for instance, have long argued that the Court's insistence

106. Id. at 185-320.
107. Id. at 186-230, 249-90.
108. 517 U.S.484 (1996).
109. Id. at 505.
110. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
111. Id. at 530-31. See generally Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, StructuralDue
Process, and Semisubstantive ConstitutionalReview, 75 S.CAL. L. REv. 1281, 1315-19 (2002)
(discussing Supreme Court review of Congressional factfinding in First Amendment cases).
The Supreme Court's review of empirical evidence in First Amendment cases has varied
considerably. In some instances, the Court defers to the factual findings of legislators, without any
independent review. The clearest example of this is in the obscenity area where the Court willingly
deferred to the "unprovable assumptions" of legislators, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 61 (1973), and refused to demand "'scientifically certain criteria of legislation,"' id. at 60-61
(quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1968) (quoting Noble State Bank v.
Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911))). In other contexts, the Court has refused to give deference to
legislative factfinding when First Amendment rights were at stake. In Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, for instance, the Court stated that "[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot limit
judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake." 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978).The Supreme
Court's two decisions on the constitutionality of the federal "must-carry" rules-Turner
BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC,512 U.S. 622 (1994), and Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v.
FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997)-only added to the confusion by emphasizing both the importance of
independent judicial review of legislative factfinding in First Amendment cases as well as the need
for deference toward this factfinding. TurnerBroad.System, Inc., 512 U.S. at 665-66 (stating that
"courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress" but also that
this "substantial deference does not mean" that Congressional judgments "are insulated from
meaningful judicial review altogether"); Turner Broad System, Inc., 520 U.S. at 195-96. See
generally Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases After
Turner Broadcasting, Il1 HARv.L. REv. 2312 (1998) (discussing the confusion created by the two
Turner decisions); William E. Lee, ManipulatingLegislative Facts: The Supreme Court and the
First Amendment, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1261, 1261 (1998) (reviewing the Supreme Court's "widely
inconsistent evaluations of legislative facts" in First Amendment cases).
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upon empirical support for progressive legislation during the Lochnerera
was misguided."l 2 In Lochner v. New York, the Court struck down a New
York law setting maximum work hours for bakers because the Court was
unconvinced by the government's empirical claim that baking was a
hazardous profession. 13 Lawyers responded by filing "Brandeis Briefs,"
voluminous court papers brimming with empirical evidence, 1 4 until the
Court relieved them of this burden in 1937 when it stopped carefully
scrutinizing economic regulations."'
The Court's most controversial use of empirical evidence occurred in
footnote 11 of Brown v. BoardofEducation. 6 In that footnote, the Court
cited social science studies to support its claim that African-American
children were psychologically harmed by segregated education."'
Commentators subsequently questioned whether the children's
constitutional rights had depended upon the results of these studies.
Edmond Cahn, for instance, questioned whether fundamental rights should
"rise, fall, or change along with the latest fashions of psychological
literature.""' 8 Commentators also pointed out the weaknesses of these
studies" 9 and openly criticized the Court for its reliance on them. 2 °

112. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee& Robert A. Schapiro, LegislativeRecordReview, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 87, 100-01 (2001).
113. 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905); see also Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 112, at 101 (stating that
the "Court refused to defer to the legislative judgment and instead insisted on an independent
review of the available evidence"); Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial
Review, and the Bill ofRights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941,980 (1999) (stating that the constitutionality
of the New York statute "depended upon the underlying empirical question of the extent of a
material danger to the health of the workers," and that the majority "dismissed the existence of any
danger to the workers' health without much mention of the evidence that led the New York
legislature to conclude that such dangers required the protection of a law").
114. See, e.g., Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 112, at 102 (noting how Brandeis employed a
"1000-page, fact-filled brief' in Bunting v. Oregon,243 U.S. 426 (1917), in which he successfully
argued for the Court to uphold an Oregon maximum-hour law); Solove, supra note 113, at 983
(describing Brandeis's successful use of a 113-page, empirically-filled brief in Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908), just three years after Lochner); see also MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note
49, at 8 (noting that the famous Brandeis Brief in Muller v. Oregon was actually a "collection of
broad, value-laden statements supported largely by casual observation and opinion"; evidence that
was "typical of social science scholarship at that time" but which would not be accepted as "social
science evidence" today).
115. Buzbee & Schapiro, supranote 112, at 103.
116. 347 U.S. 483,494 n.ll (1954).
117. Id.
118. Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence,30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 167 (1955).
119. See, e.g., Ernest van den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the DesegregationCases-A
Reply to ProfessorKenneth Clark,6 VILL. L. REV. 69, 77 (1960) (critiquing the conclusions of one
of the empirical studies cited by the Supreme Court).
120. See, e.g., Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation:LegalRealism, ReasonedElaboration,
and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1978, at 57,
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Scholars also have assailed the Court's demands for empirical evidence
in its recent federalism jurisprudence. 2 ' The Court has required empirical
evidence that activities regulated by Congress "substantially affect"
interstate commerce and that Congressional enactments under Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power are necessary to remedy Equal
Protection violations.'22 These critics point to the illogic of requiring
legislators to produce a coherent empirical record. They note that the
legislative process does not lend itself to producing a neat, self-defined
record, comparable to one produced by a trial court.' 23 Unlike a trial court,
there is no single decisionmaker to decide which evidence is admissible.'24
The assembled record is instead often a hodgepodge of committee reports,
submitted statements, studies, and speeches, none of which reflects the full
range of debate, horse trading, and grandstanding that might underlie the

70 (stating that "[v]irtually everyone" who has examined the Brown Court's reliance on social
science evidence "now agrees that the Court erred").
121. See A. Christopher Bryant & TimothyJ. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme
Court'sNew "On the Record" ConstitutionalReview ofFederalStatutes, 86 CoRNELLL. REv. 328,
329-31 (2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80, 80-87
(2001); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 112, at 89-91; Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill:
CongressionalFindings,ConstitutionalAdjudication,andUnited States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 695, 697-98 (1995).
122. In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 & n.1, 567-68 (1995), the Supreme Court
found a federal law criminalizing possession of a handgun within one thousand feet of a school
unconstitutional. The Court sent an ambiguous message about Congress's responsibilities to
provide the Court with factual support for its claim that the regulated activity substantially affected
interstate commerce. On the one hand, the Court said that "Congress normally is not required to
make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce." Id.
at 562. At the same time, the Court was critical of the fact that "[n]either the statute nor its
legislative history contain[s] express congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate
commerce of gun possession in a school zone." Id. (quoting Brief for United States at 5-6, Lopez
(No. 93-1260)); cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02, 617 (2000) (finding the
federal Violence Against Women Act unconstitutional, notwithstanding numerous legislative
findings about the impact of gender violence on commerce, because the Court was unwilling to
permit Congress to regulate noneconomic conduct based solely upon the conduct's aggregate effect
on interstate commerce).
In Boardof Trustees v. Garrett,531 U.S. 356, 368, 374 (2001), the Court held that Congress
lacked power under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state immunity under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act because there was an inadequate factual record of unlawful
discrimination by the states. In Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,529-35 (2004), the Court held that
there was an adequate factual record to justify Congressional abrogation of state immunity for
monetary damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, at least in the context of
cases involving access to state courts. See generallyCoenen, supranote 111, at 1319-28 (discussing
the Supreme Court's review of Congressional factfinding in its federalism jurisprudence).
123. See, e.g., Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 112, at 94-95.
124. Id. at 95 (noting that "[i]n the legislative setting, no ... unitary decisionmaker accepting
evidence and explaining policy choices is likely to exist").
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125
enactment of a law.

Does this history suggest that courts should disregard empirical
evidence in child-protection censorship cases? On the one hand, much of
the criticism lodged againstjudicial use of empirical evidence is legitimate.
Judges are not trained as social scientists and therefore venture beyond
their expertise when they evaluate empirical data. Justice Powell was only
being honest when he confessed that "[m]y understanding of statistical
analysis. . . ranges from limited to zero.', 126 It is also true that the
legislative process is not ideally suited 127for developing a coherent
evidentiary record in support of legislation.
While these arguments have merit, it still might be desirable for courts
to insist upon empirical evidence when evaluating child-protection
censorship. As mentioned above, empirical evidence can help judges
decide which arguments in the child-protection censorship debate are more
compelling. 128 This does not mean that judges should whitewash the
problems associated with empirical evidence. Indeed, judicial review of
empirical evidence is likely to be palatable only if the weaknesses in the
process are acknowledged from the outset. Thus, judges should readily
concede that empirical evidence varies widely in its credibility, is often
limited or flawed, and can produce mixed results. They should admit their
own limited training for evaluating the evidence and acknowledge that the
data is often produced by "hired guns" commissioned to provide support
for one party's argument. All of this confirms that the judges do not view
the empirical evidence as a panacea for the problem of judicial review.
But judges still may believe that reliance on empirical evidence will
marginally improve the process by which laws are enacted and the courts
review these laws. A requirement that legislators provide empirical support
for their legislation can slow down the legislative process and help

125. As Professors Buzbee and Schapiro note, "legislation may reflect ...

the impact of

parallel or competing bills on a subject, constituent communications, lobbying pressure, electoral
considerations, and comments by other governmental bodies." Id. at 96.
126. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (1994), reprinted in MONAHAN &
WALKER, supra note 49, at 315. Justice Breyer similarly acknowledged in a recent case concerning
the standards for admitting expert testimony that "judges are not scientists and do not have the
scientific training that can facilitate the making" of the decision as to whether the expert testimony
is reliable. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147-48 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
Nevertheless, he expressed confidence that judges, with the help of the scientific and legal
community, as well with appropriate rules for making their determinations, could successfully
perform this function. Id. at 150 (Breyer, J.,
concurring). Justice Breyer, in fact, has been a leader
in helping bridge the gap between science and the law. As he has noted, "[i]n this age of science,
science should expect to find a warm welcome, perhaps a permanent home, in our courtrooms."
Stephen Breyer, Introduction, to FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 2000, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC

EVIDENCE 2 (2d ed. 2000).
127. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
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legislators focus on whether there truly is a nexus between the end pursued
and the means employed.'29 Likewise, judicial review of empirical
evidence can provide an effective means of weeding out some of the more
egregious forms of censorship. It would probably be difficult, for instance,
to find empirical support for the proposition that HarryPotter books are
harmful to children. A court could therefore easily dismiss a law banning
these books. Likewise, legislators might think twice before enacting childprotection censorship laws when there is no empirical evidence to support
their actions.
The fact that empirical evidence might be helpful in child-protection
censorship cases does not imply that it is necessary in all constitutional
adjudications. Much of the criticism aimed at the Supreme Court's
Lochner era and contemporary federalism jurisprudence, for instance, is
tied to larger concerns about the propriety of any judicial review in these
contexts. Commentators believe these areas are unsuited forjudicial review
because they do not lend themselves to judicially manageable standards
and are better left to the political process.' 30
By contrast, the propriety of aggressive judicial review in the First
Amendment context is universally accepted. The concern, if any, is that
courts will be too deferential to legislators and therefore inadequately
protective of speech interests. In this context, a court's insistence that
legislators provide empirical support has a different significance. Rather
than being an inappropriate meddling with a legislative prerogative-as
might be the case with the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence-a
court's insistence on empirical support for censorship can provide a way
to curb legislative encroachments on speech. Legislators could not merely
allege that censorship is necessary; they would have to provide empirical
support for their allegation. Unlike in Brown, the empirical evidence would
be required in order to take away rights rather than to grant them.
Finally, even if empirical evidence could help facilitate more effective
judicial review of child-protection censorship, it need not be required for
every factual predicate underlying the legislation. Some factual predicates
are so widely accepted that it would be unnecessary for legislators to
provide empirical support. For instance, a law that limited the access of

129. See Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration:ProtectingFundamentalValues
with Second-Look Rules ofInterbranch Dialogue,42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1575, 1655-65 (2001)
(describing how judicial insistence on empirical support can improve the legislative process).
130. See, e.g., Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 112, at 160-61 (arguing that the Rehnquist
Court's aggressive review of Congressional factfinding in the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power cases reflects "an illegitimate judicial distrust of Congress" and
is not bound by "judicially manageable standards"); Colker & Brudney, supra note 121, at 144
(criticizing the Court for "convey[ing] the message that Congress is suspect in the powers it
exercises and the manner in which it exercises them").
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very young minors to violent movies would be based on a factual
assumption that five-year-olds are not as mature as adults. Should the
government have to provide empirical support for this claim, or can a court
give the government a "free pass" on this issue? As will be discussed
subsequently, it might be appropriate for a court to take judicial notice of
such a widely-held assumption. 3 ' The challenge, of course, is in drawing
the line between those factual predicates that need empirical support and
those that do not.
This Article now turns to the substantive arguments for permitting
child-protection censorship. If courts are going to uphold this censorship,
they need to understand why they are doing so. Understanding the reasons
behind the censorship also will help courts determine the censorship's
limits.
III. SHOULD THE FIRST AMENDMENT PERMIT CENSORSHIP TO
PROTECT CHILDREN?

The Supreme Court has always accepted the notion that the First
Amendment permits censorship to protect children. Even the Court's
staunchest defenders of First Amendment rights have often adopted this
position.' 32 This eagerness to accept child-protection censorship has
allowed the Court to avoid serious consideration of why the First
Amendment permits such censorship. Even Ginsberg v. New York, the
Court's seminal decision upholding child-protection censorship, offers
only a superficial explanation for why the censorship is allowed.'33 The
decision is routinely cited for the proposition that child-protection
censorship is constitutional, but its reasoning remains largely
unexamined.'34

131. There are no clear rules as to how judicial notice operates in the context of finding
"legislative facts." The Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly failed to address this issue in its one
provision on judicial notice. FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note to subdivision (a) (stating
that "[iut deals only with judicial notice of 'adjudicative' facts" and that "[n]o rule deals with
judicial notice of'legislative' facts"). For a description of "adjudicative" and "legislative" facts, see
supra note 105.
132. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 513 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that
the "government may not constitutionally criminalize mere possession or sale ofobscene literature,
absent some connection to minors"); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 107 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the "State may have a substantial interest in precluding the
flow of obscene materials even to consenting juveniles"). But see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 650-56 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that child-protection censorship is
unconstitutional).
133. See 390 U.S. 629, 635-37 (1968).
134. E.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 743 (1996)
(citing Ginsbergfor the proposition that the state has a compelling interest in shielding minors from
offensive sex-related materials); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
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This Part tries to fill that gap by fleshing out each step in the argument
for permitting child-protection censorship. It begins by reviewing the First
Amendment's general prohibition on government censorship. It then
explores the arguments for exempting child-protection censorship from
this rule. Obviously, if a reason exists, it is because the audience for the
censored speech consists of minors. This Part therefore considers what it
is about minors thatjustifies greater government censorship. Of course, the
gist of this argument, too, is obvious: children are less mature than adults
and thus less capable of handling an unregulated marketplace of ideas. But
the simplicity of this explanation masks the complexities underlying a
more detailed argument.
A. Why Child-ProtectionCensorshipIs Problematic: The First
Amendment's GeneralProhibitionof Government Censorship
While few would argue that First Amendment jurisprudence is a model
of clarity, most would agree that the jurisprudence reflects some widely
accepted principles. Perhaps the most fundamental of these principles is
that the government may not censor speech because of its message.135 This
"anticensorship rule," a logical extension of the Supreme Court's
commitment to an open "marketplace of ideas," prohibits the government
from deciding which ideas are suitable for public discourse. 136 As Judge
Frank Easterbrook has noted, any other approach would leave the
government as "the great censor and director of which thoughts are good
for us."' 37
In practice, this anticensorship rule means that the government may not
suppress speech simply because it disapproves of a message or finds it
offensive. As Justice Brennan explained in Texas v. Johnson, it is a
"bedrock principle" of the First Amendment that "the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea.., offensive or disagreeable."' 3 8 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
held that the government may not prevent a person from burning an
140
American flag, 139 wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft,"'

(1989) (same).
135. SMOLLA, supra note 45, § 4:8 (stating that "[m]odern First Amendment cases establish
aper se rule making the punishment of speech flatly unconstitutional if the penalty is based on the
offensiveness or the undesirability of the viewpoint expressed").
136. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
137. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985), aft'd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
138. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
139. Id.at415.
140. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971).
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or publicly espousing racist views. 4 1 The Court is aware that such
offensive ideas can be emotionally disturbing to people (think of Nazis
marching in Skokie),'42 but it counsels those disturbed to "avert their eyes"
or to counter the offensive speech with more speech.'43
The anticensorship rule also means that the government may not censor
speech for the paternalistic purpose of protecting the public from "bad"
ideas. As Justice Stevens observed in 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island,
"[t]he First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations
that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to
be their own good."'" Consequently, speakers have been free to advocate
law-breaking so long as their speech was unlikely to produce serious and
immediate harm.' 45 Speakers also have been allowed to advertise liquor
and tobacco products.'46
Of course, to say that people have a right to express noxious and
offensive ideas is not the same as saying that people have a right to access
those ideas, but the former has generally implied the latter. First
Amendment cases usually discuss speakers' rights because laws typically
punish speakers. But the Supreme Court has recognized a corollary right
of listeners to receive information.'47
When these principles are put together-the prohibition on censorship

141. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-45,449 (1969).
142. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1198-99, 1206 (7th Cir. 1978).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (stating
that "[w]here the designed benefit of a content-based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities
of listeners, the general rule is that the right of expression prevails," and that "[w]e are expected to
protect our own sensibilities 'simply by averting [our] eyes"') (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21
(alteration in original)); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420 (stating that there is "no more appropriate
response to burning a flag than waving one's own"); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 210-11 (1975) (noting that "the burden normally falls upon the viewer to 'avoid further
bombardment of(his) sensibilities simply by averting (his) eyes"') (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21);
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (stating that those who were offended by the defendant's jacket could
"effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes").
144. 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996).
145. Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447.
146. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001) (stating that "tobacco retailers
and manufacturers have an interest in conveying truthful information about their products to adults,
and adults have a corresponding interest in receiving truthful information about tobacco products");
44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 508-14 (recognizing consumers' right to hear nonmisleading
information about liquor prices).
147. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
757 (1976) (in upholding the right of a consumers' group to challenge a law regulating advertising
by pharmacists, the Court stated that "[if] there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to
receive the advertising"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (stating that the "right to
receive information and ideas ...is fundamental to our free society"). For an elaboration of this
point, see Catherine J. Ross, An EmergingRight for Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U.
PA. J.CONST. L. 223, 227-33 (1999).
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and the right to access ideas-it quickly becomes apparent that childprotection censorship is at odds with the First Amendment's anticensorship
rule. After all, the whole purpose of child-protection censorship is to
protect minors from speech that might be emotionally disturbing to them
or to deny them access to speech that might encourage them to engage in
inappropriate behavior. But neither of these is a legitimate reason for
denying adults access to speech. Why, then, should the result be different
when speech is targeted at children?
Before exploring this question, it is important to acknowledge a
significant exception to the anticensorship rule. Despite the Supreme48
Court's passionate language about the evils of government censorship,
the Court has always accepted that "obscene" speech is unprotected by the
First Amendment. 149 This blind spot-a holdover from Victorian era
sensibilities-creates a gaping hole in the First Amendment's
anticensorship rule. 5° The Court officially endorsed the obscenity
exception in Roth v. United States, but it only provided feeble arguments
for doing so.' 5 ' The Court claimed that obscene speech is "utterly without
redeeming social importance," but it never explained why other types of
low-value speech continue to receive First Amendment protection.'52 The
Court provided historical support for its conclusion, but, as Professor Harry
Kalven, Jr. noted, its use of sources was "so casual as to be alarming. '
Perhaps most importantly, the Court declared obscenity unprotected
without requiring any empirical proof that the speech was harmful.154 The
Court was inundated by empirical studies but chose not to wade into this
"psychological morass."' 55

148. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 151-55.
150. See SAUNDERS, supranote 43, at 151 (describing the obscenity doctrine's focus on sexual
materials as opposed to violent materials as "an unwarranted product of Victorian era concerns with
sexuality").
151. 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
152. Id. at 484. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court provided a list of lowvalue speech that played "no essential part [in the] exposition of ideas." 351 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942) (listing lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, and fighting words). As Professor Rodney Smolla
notes, every category on this list except obscene speech has since been given some First
Amendment protection. SMOLLA, supra note 45, §§ 2:69, 2:70.
153. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 9.
154. See HEINS, supra note 6, at 63.
155. See id. (stating that the Court had "avoided the psychological morass" of"trying to assess
the actual behavioral effects of sexual speech"). The Court's willingness to declare obscene speech
unconstitutional without empirical proof of its harmfulness became more apparent in ParisAdult
Theatre I v. Slaton, decided a quarter century after Roth. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49,60 (1973) (upholding a Georgia law prohibiting the exhibition of obscene films at adult theaters
and stating that "[ilt is not for us to resolve empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation" and
that "[w]e do not demand of legislatures 'scientifically certain criteria of legislation') (quoting
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Of course, if the distribution of obscene speech to adults can be
prohibited, it certainly can be prohibited to minors. Much child-protection
censorship, however, concerns the distribution of "indecent" speech to
minors, the term commonly used for sexually-explicit, but not obscene,
speech. 51 6 A question later addressed is whether the Supreme Court should
find indecent speech targeted at minors unprotected in the same ipse dixit
fashion that it found obscene speech unprotected' 57 or whether it should
require regulators to establish the speech's harmfulness.
Finally, it also should be noted that child pornography is not protected
by the First Amendment.158 The rationale for exempting this speech,
however, is unique and of limited importance for evaluating other types of
speech regulation. The exception is based on the need to protect the
children involved in the making of the pornography and not on the impact
of the pornography on readers.' 59 Thus, the exception does not mean that
the government may ban the "idea" of children engaging in sex, nor may
it prevent the distribution of nonobscene pornography depicting adults
pretending to be minors. 160 The Supreme Court recently held, for instance,
that a federal law banning "virtual" child pornography was unconstitutional
children and
because the targeted speech did not involve the use of "real"
61
the speech being regulated was not otherwise obscene.'
B. The Argumentfor Permitting Child-ProtectionCensorship
Child-protection censorship denies minors access to speech to which
adults could not be denied. Any explanation for why the First Amendment
permits this must have something to do with the fact that the speech's
audience is children. It thus is important to understand what it is about
children that justifies more governmental control of speech.
1. How Children are Different from Adults
Laws frequently treat children differently from adults. Minors cannot
drive, vote, serve in the military, marry, or skip school.' 62 Tort, contract,

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1968) (quoting Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
U.S. 104, 110 (1911))).
156. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859 (1997) (federal act regulating obscene and
"indecent" Intemet transmissions); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 123
n.4 (1989) (federal act regulating obscene and "indecent" telephone messages).
157. This is the notion of "variable obscenity"-that the types of works which are unprotected
as obscene can vary with the context, particularly when the audience for the speech is children. See
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 635 n.4 (discussing the concept of "variable obscenity").
158. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982).
159. Id. at 756-64.
160. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246-56 (2002).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (creating a constitutional right to vote for
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and criminal law all have special rules for minors, and family law assumes
that minors will be subject to their parents' supervision until they reach the
age of majority. 163
The fact that children are treated differently does not explain why they
are treated differently. But understanding why may be critical for
understanding whether this differential treatment should be tolerated. Of
course, age is not a "suspect classification" under the Equal Protection
clause, so the government usually is free to use age classifications without
justifying them. 64 Such regulations are subject to a deferential rational
basis review which, in its classic form, constitutes essentially no scrutiny
at all.' 65
Deferential review is not appropriate, however, when age is being used
to deny people a fundamental right.'6 6 That is the case when minors are
denied access to ideas that adults may lawfully receive. 67
' The government,
in such instances, must have a compelling reason for denying minors their
fundamental right.'68 Absent a credible explanation, the denial should be

citizens "who are eighteen years of age or older"); 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2000) (allowing persons
seventeen-years-old or older to enlist for military service); LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM,
CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE LAW 494-95 (2002) (discussing laws requiring parental consent
before minors can marry); id. at 44-46 (discussing compulsory education).
163. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.10 (1962) (discussing when immaturity excludes
criminal conviction). States also have separate juvenile justice systems for trying minor offenders.
See generally SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS

946-1188 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing differences between juvenile and adult justice systems). Davis
notes that "[u]nder American law, the rearing of children generally takes place in families and is
principally the responsibility of parents, who are given broad legal authority and discretion to make
decisions involved in carrying out this role." Id.at 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14
(1981) (stating that "infants" can "incur only voidable contractual duties"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) (creating a separate standard of care for children).
164. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63 (2000); Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976).
165. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86 ("Our Constitution permits States to draw lines on the basis of
age when they have a rational basis for doing so at a class-based level, even if it 'is probably not
true' that those reasons are valid in the majority of cases.").
166. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 49, § 10.1.1, at 762 (describing how the Supreme Court
uses strict scrutiny when the government discriminates as to who can exercise a fundamental right).
167. Id. (stating that freedom of speech has been deemed a "fundamental right"); see also JOHN
E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 14.40 (7th ed. 2004) (discussing
analysis ofFirst Amendment guarantees under the Equal Protection Clause). Of course, it is usually
unnecessary to perform an equal protection analysis of laws that deny individuals First Amendment
rights because the First Amendment already provides the individuals with an independent source
of protection. Id. at 1079-80. I have decided to refer to equal protection principles in this Article
for the primary purpose of drawing attention to the discriminatory nature, and over- and underinclusiveness, of child-protection censorship laws. Id. at 1080 ("Although the analysis of First
Amendment classification under the equal protection guarantee is not common, it is important to
remember that it is always permissible to review such laws under the guarantee.").
168. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 167, at 1080 (calling for the application of strict
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presumptively unconstitutional. Thus, one must wrestle with why the
government can impose greater speech restrictions on minors than adults.
What is it about minors that justifies more speech control? Does the
government have to support this claim with empirical evidence or is it
enough for legislators merely to assert that minors are different from
adults?
The Supreme Court has not seriously wrestled with these questions in
the First Amendment context.1 69 In Ginsberg,the Court simply presumed
that children are different from adults and that these differences justify
greater speech regulation. 'TOne can infer the Court's underlying thoughts
only by reasoning backward from its explanation for upholding the New
York censorship law. The Court, for instance, said that New York had a
legitimate interest in protecting minors "'from abuses' which might
prevent their 'growth into.., well-developed men and citizens."" 7 Thus,
the Court apparently thought that minors are less "developed" than adults
and consequently more vulnerable to "abuses." The Court also stated that
New York had an interest in aiding parents in the discharge of their childrearing responsibilities.' 72 The Court therefore reasoned that parental
control over minors makes minors' First Amendment rights less robust
than those of adults.
The Supreme Court has been more forthcoming about the differences
between adults and children in other areas of constitutional law. Perhaps
the most elaborate of these discussions is in Justice Powell's plurality

scrutiny, which requires a governmental compelling interest); see also Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (stating that the "[flreedom of expression, and its intersection with the
guarantee of equal protection, would rest on such a soft foundation indeed if government could
distinguish among picketers on such a wholesale and categorical basis").
169. While the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has not gone into depth about how
children are different than adults, it has on many occasions decided cases based on the general
recognition that minors are less mature and more vulnerable than adults. The Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, for instance, repeatedly acknowledges that government involvement with
religion "can have a magnified impact on impressionable young minds." Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 383 (1985); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (finding that students will feel
pressured to participate in a prayer ceremony at a middle school graduation because "adolescents
are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and... the influence is
strongest in matters of social convention"). The Court also appears to be more willing to allow state
interests to override a minor's Free Excercise rights. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 159, 168 (1944) (upholding the conviction of an aunt for allowing her niece to sell religious
publications even though the aunt asserted her niece's belief that this fulfilled a religious
obligation). The Court noted in Prince that "[tihe state's authority over children's activities is
broader than over like actions of adults." Id. at 168. Kevin Saunders discusses these points in detail
in his book. SAUNDERS, supra note 43, at 107-17.
170. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1968).
171. Id. (quoting Prince,321 U.S. at 165).
172. Id. at 639.
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opinion in Bellotti v. Baird,'73 a case concerning a minor's right to have an
abortion without parental consent.'74 Powell began by noting that minors
are "not beyond the protection of the Constitution" but that their
constitutional rights "cannot be equated with those of adults."' 75 To explain
this disparate treatment, he focused on three characteristics that distinguish
children from adults: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability
to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child-rearing." '7 6 Powell elaborated on
each of these characteristics. The "peculiar vulnerabilit[ies]," he said, refer
to minors' special "needs for 'concern, . . . sympathy, and ... paternal
attention."" 77 Children's inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner reflects minors' lack of "experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to
them.' 78 The importance of the parental role justifies limits on minors'
freedoms because parental guidance "is essential to the growth of young
people into mature, socially responsible citizens."' 79
When placed in the First Amendment context, these distinctions help
shed light on why child-protection censorship might be permitted. The
"peculiar vulnerabilities" of minors suggest that minors need government
protection from speech because their lack of emotional and intellectual
maturity makes them vulnerable to harm. The inability of minors "to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner" suggests that the
government should limit minors' access to dangerous ideas because
173. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
174. Id. at 624-25 (plurality opinion). There is a considerable volume ofjurisprudence on this
issue. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1990); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 422-23 (1990); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 399-400 (1981);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976). See generally Martin Guggenheim,
Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 589 (2002) (discussing how
Danforth and Bellotti have restricted the rights of minors); Helena Silverstein & Leanne Speitel,
"Honey, I Have No Idea ": Court Readiness to Handle Petitions to Waive ParentalConsentfor
Abortion, 88 IOWA L. REv. 75 (2002) (analyzing how minors' constitutional rights when seeking
an abortion may be undermined by ill-prepared courts or courts opposed to granting waiver
petitions).
175. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-34 (plurality opinion).
176. Id. at 634 (plurality opinion).
177. Id. at 635 (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting McKeiver v. Pennslyvania,
403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion)); see also Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1195
(2005) (noting that "juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure").
178. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635 (plurality opinion); see also Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1195 (noting
that a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility" often cause minors to take
"impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions") (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,
367 (1993)).
179. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638 (plurality opinion); see also Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1195 (noting
that "the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult").
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minors cannot responsibly evaluate them. Finally, the "importance of the
parental role in child rearing" suggests that government censorship is
needed to assist parents with their child-rearing responsibilities.
These arguments combine to create two more generalized theories for
why child-protection censorship should be permitted. First, the government
has an independent interest in protecting minors from speech that could
harm them, either by causing psychological harm because of minors'
"peculiar vulnerabilities" or by leading minors astray because of their
"inability to make informed, mature decisions." This is a "harm theory" for
justifying child-protection censorship. Second, the government has a
vicariously derived interest in supporting parents with their child-rearing
responsibilities, which the government furthers by denying children access
to materials that their parents do not want them to see. This is a "parental
support theory" for child-protection censorship. Ginsberg never clearly
discussed how children are different from adults,'10 but the two interests it
identified for justifying child-protection censorship parallel these two
theories.' Ginsberg's reference to the state's "independent interest in
[protecting] the well-being of its youth" parallels the harm theory." 2 The
Court's reference to the right of parents "to the support of laws designed
to aid discharge of [their child-rearing] responsibility" parallels the
parental support theory.8 3
a. The Legitimacy of the Child/Adult Distinction
Judge Musmano observed in a torts case that certain characteristics of
children are beyond dispute: "The spontaneity of children in responding to
invitation to play, without calculating the risk, is as well known as the
sequence of the seasons or the regularity with which night follows day.
It
184
is not an imponderable, or a matter of speculation. It is simply fact."
Should judges in the First Amendment context be equally willing to
assume that there are differences between adults and children that justify
limiting children's free speech rights? Can they assume, for instance, that
the distinctions mentioned in Belotti are "simply facts" to be accepted as
true, or should they insist that legislators establish their veracity?
Logic suggests that the answers to these questions might depend upon
how these assumptions are used. On the one hand, neither commentators
nor judges likely would challenge the basic assumption that children as a

180. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
181. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968).
182. Id. at 640.
183. Id. at 639.
184. Jennings v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 87 A.2d 206, 212 (Pa. 1952) (Musmanno, J.,
dissenting).
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group are less mature than adults. Indeed, as long as the terms "children"
and "minors" refer to the age range from birth to eighteen, it is difficult to
dispute that the group as a whole is less mature than adults. It is probably
appropriate for judges to take judicial notice of this difference because it
is a matter of "common knowledge," or, as some commentators put it, a
fact "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to
' Even critics of child-protection censorship likely would
require proof."185
concede this point.'86 Few would stake their argument on a claim that fouryear-olds are as mature as adults.
Nevertheless, critics might argue that judges need to take into account
the vast differences between younger and older children.187 They also might
argue that reliance on generalizations is not appropriate when it results in
specific individuals being denied a fundamental right, such as the right to
access information. The problem, in short, is less with the overall
generalization about minors and more with the use of the generalization as
a basis for regulation.
b. The Problem with Relying on Generalizations
The notion of children as being less mature than adults is based upon
crude generalizations. To say that children make fewer "mature" decisions
than adults ignores the multitude of adults who routinely make immature
decisions, whether about drug or alcohol consumption, gambling, or the
assumption of debt. Similarly, to lump all minors together ignores the vast
differences in emotional and intellectual maturity within the group of
minors.
Commentators have noted, for instance, the substantial developmental
differences between young minors and minors approaching maturity.188 A
federally commissioned report, Youth, Pornography,and the Internet,
charts these changing characteristics through six different stages: Infancy
(0-2); Early Childhood (3-5); Childhood (6-9); Preadolescence (10-12);
Early Adolescence (13-15); and Late Adolescence (16-18).189
Notwithstanding these variations, legislators often regulate minors as a
group. Professor Etzioni notes that both proponents and critics of child-

185. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 493 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
186. HEINS, supra note 6, at 258-59 (acknowledging that toddlers, grade schoolers, and
teenagers do not have equal levels of maturity).
187. See, e.g., id. at 259 (noting that child-protection censorship often "merges toddlers, grade
schoolers, and teenagers into one vast pool of vulnerable youth" and that "there ought at least to
be more thoughtful and finely calibrated judgments about" the differences among these groups).
188. Etzioni, supra note 66, at 42-47 (suggesting that regulators should have to take into
account the differences between young children, those below the age oftwelve, and teenagers, those
from age thirteen to eighteen).
189. YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supranote 18, at 116-17 tbl. 5.1.
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protection censorship take advantage of this fact by focusing their
arguments on the subgroups whose interests most strongly advance their
case:
Those who favor full First Amendment rights for children of
all ages tend to use the term "young people," "youngsters," or
"students" and point to examples of the harm done when
teenagers' access to information about, say, HIV or abortion
is limited. Those who favor controls tend to call all minors
"children" and point to the harm done to toddlers when they
are exposed to pornographic or violent material on
television. 9 '
Etzioni suggests that legislators must be cognizant of the differences
between younger and older minors and should tailor their legislation to the
needs and vulnerabilities of each group. 19' He suggests that minors be
divided into two groups: "children," those twelve and under, and
"teenagers," those thirteen to eighteen.' 92 One might wonder whether
reliance on these two categories is sufficient to pass constitutional muster
or whether lawmakers must consider the full range of developmental
possibilities when they regulate.
These concerns point to a larger question about the legitimacy of using
generalizations to regulate. Can the government, for simplicity's sake,
lump all minors together, even if it is aware of their developmental
differences, or must it fine tune its legislation to account for these
differences? Admittedly, grouping minors together will be both
overinclusive and underinclusive, but the alternative-either tailoring
legislation to each subgroup, or, at the extreme, providing individualized
determinations for each group member-can be a legislative and
administrative nightmare.
The legitimacy of regulation based on generalizations presents an equal
protection question.'93 When viewed in this light, the constitutionality of
age classifications can be argued both ways. On the one hand, age is not a
suspect class so that laws discriminating based on age are subject to a
deferential rational basis review.' 94 On the other hand, a line of equal
protectionjurisprudence holds that fundamental rights may not be allocated

190. Etzioni, supra note 66, at 43 (footnote call number omitted).
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 49, § 9.1.2, at 643 (noting that "[a]ll equal protection cases
pose the same basic question: Is the government's classification justified by a sufficient purpose?").
194. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S.
93, 96-97 (1979); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
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in a discriminatory fashion.' 95 If this latter authority is controlling, the use
of crude age classifications to deny minors' First Amendment rights would
be subject to strict scrutiny.
Case law supports both the proposition that age may be used to deny
minors a fundamental right and the proposition that it may not be so used.
The former is reflected in cases such as Moe v. Dinkins,'96 in which a
federal district court held that New York could forbid minors from
marrying without their parents' consent. By contrast, in Planned
Parenthoodv. Danforth, the Supreme Court held that minors could not be
prevented from having an abortion, even without their parents' consent, if
the minors could prove that they were mature enough to make the
decision.'97 In Bellotti v. Baird, Powell explained these differing
approaches by noting that a minor could always wait to marry, but that
delaying an abortion has irreversible consequences:
The pregnant minor's options are much different from
those facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding
whether to marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the
age of majority is required simply to postpone her decision.
She and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibility
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks
from the onset of pregnancy."
What does Bellotti's distinction suggest about the legitimacy of denying
minors access to speech? For most of the information that states try to deny
minors-pornography, violent video games, or liquor advertisements-it
would hardly seem to matter if a minor was forced to wait until majority
to get access. At the same time, this balance between administrative
convenience and a minor's First Amendment rights would tip the other
way if a state sought to prevent a mature minor from accessing information
of immediate importance. One can easily imagine, for instance, a court
concluding that the government may not deny a mature minor access to
information about abortion, contraceptives, or AIDS. This suggests that

195. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,447 (1972) (protecting the right of unmarried
individuals to contraceptives under the Equal Protection Clause); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618,638 (1969) (protecting the right to travel under the Equal Protection Clause); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 49, § 10.1.1, at 763 (stating that if a fundamental right "is protected under equal
protection, the issue is whether the government's discrimination as to who can exercise the right
is justified by a sufficient purpose").
196. 533 F. Supp. 623, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982).
197. 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
198. 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (plurality opinion).
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courts scrutinizing child-protection censorship should consider whether a
law affects all minors or only young minors, and the importance and
immediacy of the suppressed speech to the affected minors.
Finally, in drawing lines between older and younger minors for First
Amendment purposes, courts should be attentive to the rules developed in
other areas of constitutional law. The Supreme Court, for instance, held
until recently that sixteen-year-olds may be tried as adults and sentenced
to death.' 99 It would be difficult to reconcile this holding with a separate
decision holding that sixteen-year-olds may be denied access to violent
video games because of their lack of maturity. Similarly, the Court has held
that minors cannot be denied access to contraceptives and must be given
an opportunity to obtain an abortion without their parents' consent.2"'
These holdings suggest that mature minors cannot be denied access to
information about reproduction, contraceptives, and abortion. Otherwise,
minors would be in the odd position of having a right to engage in
activities about which they would have no comparable right to access
information.
2. How the Differences Between Children and Adults Justify
Child-Protection Censorship
The prior Part suggested that the differences between children and
adults might justify child-protection censorship to protect minors from
harmful speech (the harm theory) and to support parents in their childrearing responsibilities (the parental support theory).20 ' While these
theories might seem acceptable in the abstract, their implementation raises
a multitude of questions.

199. In Stanfordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,380 (1989), the Supreme Court held that there was
no historical or "modem societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on"
individuals who committed murders at the ages of sixteen or seventeen. Consequently, the Court
held that executing such individuals did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. Id. The Court had decided a few days prior that the execution of individuals
who were fifteen years or younger at the time they committed an offense did constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). In March 2005, the
Supreme Court overturned Stanford and held that capital punishment may not be imposed on
defendants who were sixteen or seventeen at the time a crime was committed. Roper v. Simmons,
125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005).
200. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (finding unconstitutional a
state law forbidding sale or distribution of contraceptives to minors); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74
(finding unconstitutional a blanket prohibition on minor abortions without parental consent).
201. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
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a. The Government's Interest in Protecting Children from
Harmful Speech
There are many instances of the government regulating speech to
prevent harm. The government regulates speech to prevent economic
harms (e.g., copyright, trademark, trade secret laws) and social harms (e.g.,
defamation, privacy torts).2 °2 It also regulates speech that incites imminent
physical harm." 3
Yet the harms that the government seeks to prevent with childprotection censorship are the very harms that do not ordinarily justify a
First Amendment exception. These are harms that result from a listener's
reaction to a message: that the message either will be psychologically
disturbing to a listener or will encourage a listener to engage in
inappropriate behavior. 2" The First Amendment's prohibition on
government censorship has meant that these "reactive" harms are not, at
least in the adult context, a legitimate basis for regulating speech.2"5
Otherwise, the majority could suppress speech it found offensive, or the
government could engage in "thought control" by denying the public
access to ideas that the government thought were harmful.
If these reactive harms do not justify censorship aimed at adults, why
should they do so for children? The argument previously made was that
this censorship is justified because children are different from adults.2°6
Because of children's "peculiar vulnerabilities" and their inability to make
"informed, mature" decisions, the government should be permitted to
intervene and protect them from noxious ideas.2 °7
If one accepts this argument, it only begins the constitutional inquiry.
Courts still must determine which types of speech are "harmful" to
children and thus subject to regulation. This "harmfulness" determination
has important free speech implications as legislators could potentially label
a wide range of speech harmful to children (e.g., Huckleberry Finn, the

202. See generally SMOLLA, supra note 45, §§ 4:17, 4:19 (Smolla refers to these as
"[rielational harms" and notes that the government's interest in preventing these harms is "quite
strong," although not as strong as its interest in preventing physical harms.).
203. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
204. SMOLLA, supranote 45, § 4:18 (referring to these types of harm as "reactive").
205. Id. § 4:19 (stating that "[r]eactive harms... generally may not be used as justifications
for the regulation of speech").
206. See supra Part II.B.l.a.
207. This would be one of the many ways in which the law, both common law and
constitutional, acts paternalistically to protect minors because of their immaturity (e.g., minors may
not vote, marry, drive, or serve in the military). See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (noting that, because children lack full
capacity, states "may deprive [them] of other rights-the right to marry ... or the right to
vote-deprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults").
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theory of evolution).2"8 The constitutionality of child-protection censorship,
therefore, depends on how courts decide which speech is harmful.
i. Determining Which Speech Is "Harmful"
Courts could use a variety of approaches for determining which speech
is harmful to minors. At one extreme, they could defer to the legislators'
determinations that speech is harmful. This approach has the benefit of
simplicity, but it would abdicate the courts' responsibility to ensure that
minors' First Amendment rights are not being violated. One need only
imagine unchecked legislators declaring speech about homosexuality,
socialism, or abortion harmful to recognize the disadvantages of this
approach.
At the other extreme, judges could rely on their own sense of what
speech is harmful to minors. This approach has the benefit of giving judges
a check on the legislative process, but it subjects them to criticism that they
are merely substituting their own judgments for those of the legislators.
Part II suggested that one way out of this dilemma is for courts to base
their decisions on empirical data.2"9 Courts could insist upon empirical
proof before finding any particular type of speech harmful. Such an
approach would give judges a check on legislators while insulating them
from the charge that they are a "bevy of Platonic Guardians., 2 0 But this
"scientific" solution hardly is a panacea.
To begin with, the same societal concerns that lead legislators to limit
children's access to speech also can limit the ability of researchers to study
the impact of the speech. Most child-protection censorship, for instance,
limits children's access to sexual materials. There is little social scientific
evidence examining the impact of this material, however, because it is
thought to be unethical, if not illegal, to expose children to it. 21' Critics of
this censorship frequently point to the absence of evidence establishing the
harmfulness of sexual materials, 212 but this absence may be due to the lack
of evidence as much as to the existence of evidence negating the harm.
Even when social science evidence is plentiful, it can be inconclusive.
This is not surprising, as proving a causal connection between speech and

208. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (finding an Arkansas law
forbidding the teaching of evolution in state schools unconstitutional).
209. See supraPart II.B.
210. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (1960).
211. YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 144-45 box 6.1 (giving

explanations for the "[s]parse [r]esearch [b]ase" on the impact of sexually explicit material on
children); Etzioni, supra note 66, at 38 (noting that "[e]thical considerations prevent researchers
from conducting experiments that directly test the effects of pornography on children").
212. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 43, at 504 (stating that "it is nearly impossible to find an iota
of evidence that controversial speech about sex harms children").
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children's emotions or antisocial behavior is not something that lends itself
to empirical analysis. 213 Children are subject to so many influences-their
parents, their teachers, their peers, poverty, and crime-that it is difficult
to isolate any particular variable as the source of their troubles. While
social scientists have tried to establish these connections, their results are
often inconclusive." 4 One still can find researchers engaging in the same
debate over which Plato and Aristotle fought-whether exposure to
unseemly
speech has a harmful, corrupting effect or a beneficial, cathartic
2 15
effect.
The impact of violent speech on minors provides a good example.
Because violent speech is protected by the First Amendment, researchers
have studied its influence on minors and have produced a considerable
volume of literature. 2 6 Nonetheless, legal scholars interpreting this
literature continue to find plenty of room for disagreement. Those who
favor child-protection censorship, such as Saunders and Etzioni, describe
the evidence as providing definitive proof that violent speech begets
violent behavior.217 Saunders summarizes the recent reports and concludes
that "[t]he view of the scientific community seems to be that the debate is
over and that it is clear that there is a connection between media violence
and aggression in the real world. 2 18 By contrast, Catherine Ross, who has
written critically of child-protection censorship, finds the evidence
inconclusive: "Although social scientists point to correlations between
violence in the media and violent behavior, they have not found evidence
that exposure to depictions
of violence causes or even contributes to
2 19
antisocial behavior.,

How should courts deal with the paucity of social science evidence in
some contexts (sexual speech) and the inconclusiveness of it in others
(violent speech)? The answers depend on how courts view their
213. HEINs, supranote 6, at 253 (noting the "inability of social science to quantify the impact
of art or entertainment").
214. Id. at 242 ("What must strike any open-minded student of the subject.., is that despite
widely publicized claims that adverse effects have been proven, the studies are ambiguous,
disparate, and modest in their results.").
215. Id. at 15-16 (discussing debate between Plato and Aristotle over the effects of art and
entertainment).
216. YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 149 (noting that researchers
have been able to study the impact of violent materials on minors "because our society has more
permissive attitudes about allowing young people to view violent material than about allowing them
to see sexually explicit material").
217. SAUNDERS, supra note 43, at 44-46 (describing empirical evidence establishing the
harmful impact of violent speech on minors); Etzioni, supra note 66, at 39 (stating that, "[o]verall,
the social science data strongly support the need to protect children from harmful material,
especially from exposure to violence in the media and on the Internet").
218. SAUNDERS, supra note 43, at 45.
219. Ross, supra note 43, at 506.
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responsibilities as monitors of child-protection censorship. As noted in Part
II, all scholars agree that courts should scrutinize child-protection
censorship to ensure that First Amendment rights are not being violated.22
But some argue that child-protection censorship poses less of a threat to
First Amendment values than censorship aimed at adults, and that courts
should give legislators more "breathing room" when reviewing the
" ' Judicial review of empirical evidence might be one juncture
legislation.22
where such breathing room is appropriate. This would be especially true
if, as suggested above, it is impossible to definitively prove that the speech
is harmful.222
At the same time, the inconclusive nature of the empirical evidence
should not dissuade judges from demanding the evidence and considering
it in their deliberations. Forcing legislators to provide even ambiguous
evidence still can have salutary effects. To begin with, and as noted in Part
II, it can give courts a tool for weeding out some of the most ill-founded
censorship efforts. 223 Legislators may be hard-pressed, for instance, to
provide credible evidence that exposure to the theory of evolution or
Huckleberry Finn will cause minors serious harm.224 In addition, forcing
legislators to provide empirical support can prompt legislators to deliberate
more carefully. Professor Dan Coenen, for instance, has concluded that the
Supreme Court's demand for empirical evidence in its federalism and
affirmative action jurisprudence has served this purpose.2 25 While he
acknowledges that the Court's approach, which he calls a "proper-findingsand-study" requirement,226 may merely produce better paper trails, he
nevertheless argues that the requirement can have the beneficial effect of
"slowing down the policymaking process and ...bringing into sharper
focus the potential costs of legislative action.' ' 227

The difficulty ofproving a definitive causal connection between speech
and harm should give courts pause before invalidating child-protection
censorship legislation for lack of empirical proof. But there is a difference
between giving legislators breathing room and giving them complete
deference. Courts still should feel free to reject empirical evidence that is
facially weak or unconvincing. While judges are not trained as social
221
scientists, 28they do have tools to make these determinations. Indeed, ever

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Etzioni, supra note 66, at 52-53.
See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
Coenen, supra note 129, at 1655-65.
Id.at 1655, 1688.
Id. at 1688-89.
See supranote 120 and accompanying text.
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since the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,229 courts routinely have had to evaluate a whole
range of scientific and technical evidence for its relevance and reliability. 3 °
In doing this, they often consider a variety of factors, such as whether a
study's theory is "testable," whether the study has been submitted for peer
review or publication, what the study's error rate is, and whether the
study's findings are generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community.23 Courts also can look to see if a consensus is emerging
among social scientists.232 For example, the fact that the American
Academy of Pediatrics, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry, the American Psychological Association, the American
Medical Association, the American Academy of Family Physicians, and
the American Psychiatric Association issued ajoint statement concluding
that "well over 1000 studies . . . point overwhelmingly to a causal
connection between media violence and aggressive behavior in some
children" suggests that the argument that media violence spawns actual
violence should not be summarily rejected.233
But what about areas where the social science evidence is absent as
opposed to ambiguous? Of course, if there are no ethical or legal
constraints preventing the collection of data, then courts should insist on
evidence being collected before they consent to limitations on First
Amendment rights. But when ethical and legal restraints prevent the
collection of data, such as for the impact of sexual speech on minors,234
courts cannot fairly put legislators in the "Catch-22" of having to provide
data that is unobtainable.
One option is for courts to excuse legislators from providing empirical
proof of harm from sexual materials. Indeed, that is precisely what the
Supreme Court did when it initially concluded that obscene speech was not
protected by the First Amendment.2 35 Although the Court was presented
with empirical evidence, it chose to ignore this evidence and instead based

229. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
230. Daubert is part of a trilogy of cases on the judge's role in screening scientific and
technical evidence. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 146-47, 158 (1999); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146-47 (1997); Daubert,509 U.S. at 597.
231. Daubert,509 U.S. at 593-94.
232. Id. at 594 (noting that "[w]idespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling
particular evidence admissible, and 'a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal
support within the community' may properly be viewed with skepticism") (citations omitted)
(quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
233. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics et al., Joint Statement on the Impact of Entertainment Violence
on Children (July 26, 2000), at http://www.aap.org/advocacy/releases/jstmtevc.htm (last visited
May 4, 2005).
234. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
235. See HEINS, supra note 6, at 63.
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its decision on historical practices and its own determination of the
speech's minimal value.236 Courts could use a similar approach for laws
that shield children from sexually-explicit, but not obscene, speech.
The Supreme Court, in fact, used such a deferential approach in
Ginsbergv. New York.2 3 7 The Court acknowledged that there was empirical
evidence about the impact of sexual speech but rejected the need to rely on
this evidence by stating that "[w]e do not demand of legislatures
'scientifically certain criteria of legislation."' 238 Using a deferential rational
basis test, the Court upheld the New York law limiting minors' access to
sexual materials because the Court could not say that the law had "no
'
rational relation to the objective of safeguarding... minors from harm."239
In subsequent years the Court has applied closer scrutiny to childprotection censorship, but it has continued to adhere to Ginsberg's
conclusion that the government may shield children from sexually-explicit,
but not obscene, speech.24° Indeed, the proposition that the government has
a compelling interest in protecting minors from sexual speech is so
established that it is usually a perfunctory aspect of the Court's analysis.24 '
Just as the Court in Roth did not demand proof that obscene speech was
harmful to adults,242 so the Court has not demanded evidence that this
"variable obscenity" is harmful to minors.
The Court's willingness to forgo any assessment of the impact of sexual
speech is misplaced. While it may be true that the Court did not demand
such evidence in its landmark obscenity case, it is also true that many
scholars have been harshly critical of the Court's obscenity
jurisprudence.243 Extending the logic of these cases to the area of childprotection censorship would only propagate an earlier mistake. The Court
would better serve First Amendment interests by insisting upon some
empirical evidence of harm from sexual speech, just as it should do with
236. Id. In ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton, the Court openly acknowledged that the obscenity
exception to the First Amendment did not depend upon the existence of empirical evidence
establishing the speech's harmfulness. 413 U.S. 48, 60-61 (1973).
237. 390 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1968).
238. Id. (quoting Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911)).
239. Id. at 643.
240. See, e.g., Sable Communications ofCal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (applying
strict scrutiny to a child-protection censorship law but also holding that there is a compelling
governmental interest "in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors" which
"extends to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult
standards").
241. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 743
(1996); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc., 492 U.S. at 126.
242. See supra notes 151-55.
243. Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 940 (1980)
(describing the Court's "inaccurate factfinding" in the Paris Theatre Salon I obscenity case as
"obviously deplorable").
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other areas of speech. Of course, the Court would have to make
accommodations to address the fact that specific evidence about the impact
of this type of speech on minors is lacking because of ethical and legal
considerations. In light of this fact, the Court might have to extrapolate
conclusions from studies of adults or rely more on psychological theories
than empirical evidence. 2"
The lower courts hearing challenges to child-protection censorship laws
have been uncertain as to what the Supreme Court wants them to do with
empirical evidence. In cases involving the suppression of sexual speech,
lower courts generally assume that no empirical evidence is required.245
That, after all, is what the Supreme Court did in Ginsberg.246 The courts
are less certain, however, about whether empirical proof is required when
the government regulates speech other than sexual speech. In American
Amusement Machine Ass 'n v. Kendrick,247 for instance, which concerned
minors' access to violent speech, Judge Richard Posner interpreted
Ginsbergto mean that empirical proof was required only when "common
sense" did not suggest the speech's harmfulness.248 Kendrick concerned the
constitutionality of an Indianapolis ordinance that required video arcade
owners to deny minors access to violent video games unless they were
accompanied by a parent.249 The district court upheld the ordinance relying
on Ginsberg's deferential "reasonable basis" test. 250 In reversing, Judge
Posner noted that Ginsberg"did not insist on social scientific evidence that
quasi-obscene images are harmful to children" because the Court "thought
this [was] a matter of common sense." 251 Based on this observation, Posner
concluded that the government is exempted from providing empirical proof
of harm only when common sense suggests the speech's harmfulness. 2
Applying this analysis to the facts of the case, Posner found that

244. YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 145-49 (describing

psychoanalytic, arousal, social learning, information processing, cultivation, and uses and
gratification theories and discussing how each might analyze minor exposure to sexually-explicit
materials).
245. See, e.g., State v. Evenson, 33 P.3d 780, 782 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
246. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1968). By contrast, the Court has been
much more willing to police the empirical question ofwhether allegedly harmful speech is actually
accessible to children. In PlayboyEntertainmentGroup,Inc., for instance, the Court required proof
that children were likely to be exposed to the allegedly harmful speech, even though it was willing
to accept at face value the argument that the speech itself was harmful. 529 U.S. 803, 811, 819
(2000). See generally Ross, supra note 43, at 502-03 (giving other examples of the Court insisting
on evidence that minors would be exposed to the allegedly harmful speech).
247. 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
248. Id. at 573, 579.
249. Id. at 573.
250. Id. at 574; see also Ginsberg,390 U.S. at 636.
251. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 579.
252. See id.
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common sense did not support the city's claim that the violent speech was
harmful.253 To the contrary, he thought the city's claim was "implausible"
' Because common sense did not support
or "at best wildly speculative."254
the speech's harmfulness, the city had to prove its harmfulness with
empirical evidence.255 Posner concluded that the city did not meet this
burden and consequently found the law unconstitutional. 256 As he noted in
summary, the "common sense reaction to the Indianapolis ordinance could
be overcome by social scientific evidence, but has not been. 257
If one accepts the previous argument-that courts should not uphold
child-protection censorship unless there is empirical proof of harm-then
Posner's interpretation of Ginsbergis problematic because it allows courts
to bypass this requirement whenever common sense suggests that speech
is harmful. An Arizona state court, for example, used Posner's reasoning
to dismiss an argument that empirical proof of harm was required for the
suppression of indecent sexual materials.258 State v. Evenson concerned a
state law that prohibited the placement of coin-operated vending machines
with indecent materials in places accessible to minors.259 Amicus curiae
cited Kendrick for the proposition that the State had to provide empirical
evidence of harm to children.26 In rejecting this argument, the court noted
that Kendrick actually said that empirical evidence was not required when
common sense supported the harmfulness of the material. 26' Because the
Supreme Court in Ginsbergalready had held that the harmfulness of sexual
materials to minors was "a matter of common sense," the court concluded
that Kendrick's empirical requirement was inapplicable.262
Of course, part of what distinguished Evenson from Kendrick was that
the speech being regulated in Evenson already had been identified by the
Supreme Court as harmful to minors. Still, the underlying problem is that
the Supreme Court has not adopted the principle that speech can be
censored only if it is shown to be harmful to minors. Ginsberg suggested
that the government need not meet such a burden, at least when sexual
speech is being suppressed, 263 and Posner extended this logic to hold that
the government need not satisfy this requirement whenever common sense

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
(1968)).
263.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 579-80.
Id. at 579.
See State v. Evenson, 33 P.3d 780, 785-86 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 782.
Id. at786n.10.
Id.
Id. (quoting Kendrick,244 F.3d at 579 (discussing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
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suggested that speech was harmful. 2" The Supreme Court should reject
these inferences and clarify that child-protection censorship will be upheld
only if there is credible evidence of the regulated speech's harmfulness.265
Of course, once the Supreme Court has found that empirical evidence
supports the conclusion that a certain type of speech is harmful to minors,
lawmakers should not be forced to meet this empirical burden whenever
they regulate the same type of speech. Opponents still should be permitted
to present new evidence to challenge the Court's conclusion. But
supporters of the regulation should not be forced to repeat the process of
submitting empirical evidence on an issue that already has been
adjudicated.
ii. The Limits of the "Harmful Speech" Exception
Empirical proof of "harmfulness to minors" cannot, by itself, justify a
First Amendment exception for child-protection censorship. Social
scientists, after all, might be able to show that minors would be upset by
a wide range of information, including information about AIDS, abortion,
the Holocaust, or other controversial or disturbing topics. Empirical proof
that harm might exist, thus, cannot give the government carte blanche to
censor.
Courts wrestling with the "harmful to minors" exception, therefore,
must consider not only the empirical evidence of harmfulness but also the
value of the speech being regulated. Of course, the notion of courts ranking
speech is anathema to the First Amendment. The picture ofjudges deciding
which speech is worthy of protection stands in stark contrast to the
"bedrock principle" that the government may not choose which ideas it
favors. 2" Nevertheless, courts have never been able to fully escape the
process of ranking speech. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the
obscenity and commercial speech areas offers the most vivid examples of
speech ranking,267 but ranking also appears more subtly in such areas as

264. See supra notes 247-57 and accompanying text.
265. While ajudge's common sense beliefthat speech is harmful should not eliminate the need
for empirical proof of harm, it might help lessen the government's burden of proof. Cf Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) ("The quantum of empirical evidence needed
to satisfy heightenedjudicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty
and plausibility of the justification raised.").
266. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also SMOLLA, supra note 45, § 4:8
(stating that "[a]ll ideas are created equal in the eyes of the First Amendment-even those ideas that
are universally condemned and run counter to constitutional principles").
267. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (creating an intermediate standard of review for regulations of commercial speech); Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (reaffirming that obscene speech is not protected by the First
Amendment).
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defamation and government employee speech.268
Child-protection censorship may be another area in which courts have
little choice but to rank speech. For courts to do this credibly, they must act
in a way that limits their discretion as much as possible. How courts can
best do this is explored in Part IV, which considers
how child-protection
2 69
censorship can be kept within tolerable limits.

b. The Government's Interest in Supporting Parents
The second theory for justifying child-protection censorship is that it is
necessary to help parents control the upbringing of their children. Parents
presumably do not want their children to become violent, cigarettesmoking, sex perverts, but they may think it difficult to prevent that result
if their children are constantly playing violent video games, admiring
chain-smoking camels, and ogling Internet pornography.
State empowerment of parents is in many ways an attractive basis for
a First Amendment exception. This is because parents' right to control
their children's upbringing is itself of constitutional pedigree. The Supreme
Court has referred to the "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control"27 and has said
that it is a basic tenet of our society that parents have "authority in their
' It would not be
own household to direct the rearing of their children."271
surprising, then, for the Court to find a compelling governmental interest
in shielding children from speech that their parents think is
inappropriate.272
Yet the right of parents to control their children's upbringing does not

268. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
(allowing a private defamation plaintiff to recover presumed and punitive damages even in the
absence of "actual malice" if the speech does not involve "matters of public concern"); Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (giving greater protection to government employee expression
relating to matters of public concern).
269. See infra Parts IV.A.1.b, IV.A.2.b, IV.A.3.b.
270. Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the HolyNames of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510,534-35
(1925).
271. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
272. One benefit of finding a compelling interest under this rubric is that it comes with a selflimiting principle: that the Court is likely to find a compelling interest to override the First
Amendment only when there is a competing constitutional right at stake. Such a principle dovetails
nicely with one of the few other exceptions to the First Amendment's general prohibition on
content-based regulations: laws intended to protect the fundamental right to vote. This principle was
illustrated in Burson v. Freeman, in which the Supreme Court upheld a content-based ban on
soliciting within one hundred feet of a polling place. 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992). The Court
acknowledged that this was a "rare case" in which a law "survive[d] strict scrutiny" but said that
this occurred because "free speech rights conflict[ed] with another fundamental right, the right to
cast a ballot in an election free from the taint of intimidation and fraud." Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss3/2

52

Garfield:
Protecting
Children
from Speech
FROMSPEECH
CHILDREN
PROTECTING

necessarily imply a right to state censorship. Parents, after all, already have
tremendous power to control their children's upbringing, particularly
during pre-adolescent years. The Supreme Court might reasonably
conclude that parents' child-rearing abilities will only be slightly impaired
if the government does not assist them by censoring speech.
The Court also might conclude that parents should have to compete
with the marketplace of ideas for influence on their children. This notion
was raised in Wisconsin v. Yoder,273 which concerned the right of Amish
parents to remove their children from school after eighth grade.2 74 The

parents expressed concern that "high school tends to emphasize intellectual
and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly
success, and social life with other students," all of which the parents said
were incompatible with Amish values." 5 The Supreme Court ruled in favor
of the parents,276 but some Justices openly questioned the propriety of
helping parents deprive their children of access to ideas.2 77 Even the
majority suggested that the case might have been decided differently if the
parents had sought to prevent their children from having any secular
education, or if the children had wanted to attend high school against their
parents' wishes.27 8

The state's interest in regulating speech to facilitate parental control,
therefore, rests on shaky ground. The fact that parents have a constitutional
right to control their children's upbringing does not necessarily imply that
they have a right to state censorship. It is also unclear whether helping
parents deny their children access to ideas is a legitimate use of the state's
power. If the Court believes that the government has a compelling interest
in censoring speech to assist parents, it must explain why parents should
not be forced to compete with an uncensored marketplace of ideas and
when, if ever, children's interest in access to speech should override their
parents' interest in denying them access.2 79

273. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
274. Id. at 207.
275. Id. at 211.
276. Id. at 234.
277. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (stating that "if an Amish child desires to attend
high school, and is mature enough to have that desire respected, the State may well be able to
override the parents' religiously motivated objections").
278. Id. at 212 (indicating that the Amish "do not object to elementary education"); id. at 225
(rejecting the state's claim that this "brief additional period" of formal education was necessary to
enable the Amish to effectively participate in society); id at 231 (noting that the state did not claim
that the parents "were preventing their children from attending school against their expressed
desires"); see also id. at 238 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]his would be a very different
case ... if respondents' claim were that their religion forbade their children from attending any
school at any time").
279. See generally Ross, supra note 147 (exploring when children's right to access
information should override their parents' objections).
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i. Determining When Government Support Is Justified
Even if courts accept that parental support justifies some childprotection censorship, they still must consider whether parents actually
want and need this state assistance. A rigorous analysis must consider a
number of issues.
State censorship would seem legitimate only if parents actually desired
the state's assistance. Of course, a court reviewing a child-protection law
might reasonably assume that legislators acted at the behest of a majority
of their constituents. Nevertheless, there may be occasions when
legislators, responding to a strident minority (e.g., Christian
fundamentalists), enact laws that go beyond what most parents want. There
also may be communities in which the bulk of the electorate no longer
rears children (e.g., a retirement community in Florida), but which
nevertheless pushes for stricter speech regulations than the minority of
child-rearing parents desires.
Government censorship to assist parents also would seem questionable
if parents did not genuinely need state help. If parents could themselves
protect their children, there would be little reason for overriding the First
Amendment's anticensorship principle. Thus, the state should not be
permitted to censor speech if parents, without state censorship, could
protect their children by monitoring them at video arcades, installing
filtering software on their computers, and rejecting subscriptions to
magazines with liquor ads.2"'
The usual response to this argument is that parents need help. Because
the media are overwhelmingly pervasive, because children are not always
under their parents' control, or because parents lack the time to supervise
their children adequately, parents require the government's assistance to
ensure that their children are not exposed to harmful ideas.28
The constitutional significance of these arguments is not entirely clear.
If parents cannot protect their children from exposure to harmful ideas,
perhaps governmental intervention is justified. If parents are capable of
protecting their children, but are simply too busy, too tired, or too selfabsorbed, then the constitutional justification for censorship is
questionable. Should state censorship be allowed if parents have the time
to monitor their children but simply do not want to do so? Or should it be

280. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 855 (1997) (noting that "the evidence indicates that
'a reasonably effective [technological] method by which parents can prevent their children from
accessing sexually explicit and other material ... will soon be widely available"') (quoting ACLU
v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
281. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (explaining that "the ease with which
children may obtain access to broadcast material . . . justifies] special treatment of indecent
broadcasting").
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allowed only if parents do not have time to monitor their children because
they are industriously working? Moreover, if there are ways in which the
state could facilitate better parental control (e.g., by requiring filtering
devices like the V-chip, or by providing tax incentives for parents to stay
at home), must the state exhaust these nonspeech alternatives before it can
censor speech? In the commercial speech context, for instance, the
Supreme Court has insisted that the government use nonspeech regulations
to accomplish its goals before it resorts to speech regulation.282 Should the
same rule apply to child-protection censorship?
These issues can become numbingly complex as courts wrestle with
whether a regulation is the least restrictive means for protecting children
from harmful speech. Consider, for example, the Child Online Protection
Act (COPA),2 83 which made it illegal for websites to contain harmful
information that was accessible to children. 284 Litigants challenging this
law might argue that a less restrictive means of protecting children is for
parents to monitor their children's Internet use. Such a "leave it to mom
and pop" approach, a favorite of civil liberty groups, is undeniably less
speech-restrictive than any government regulation. But how much credence
do courts have to give this approach? Can a court summarily dismiss it as
an "unreasonable" alternative because parents are too busy to monitor their
children, or must it first be convinced that parents have exhausted all
possible self-help remedies (such as installing filtering software) before it
will permit the government to resort to censorship? Similarly, if effective
filtering software is not available or if it is too expensive, should the court
require the government to create incentives for the development of the
software and to subsidize its purchase by poorer families before the court
allows the government to censor?
Yet this only begins the inquiry. For even if parents could easily install
cheap and effective filtering software on their home computers, children
still might have access to computers at their friends' homes, Internet cafes,
or libraries. Does this mean that the filtering solution is not a "reasonable"
alternative to the government regulation? And what if the software blocks
only some but not all of the speech that would be implicated by the
government's regulation? Is this "some but not all" alternative close
enough to be considered a "reasonable" alternative?
These issues provided fodder for debate in the Supreme Court's recent

282. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 511 (1996) (stating that it is "quite
clear that banning speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct"); id. at
530 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the "ready availability" of nonspeech
measures for advancing the state's interests "demonstrates that the fit between ends and means is
not narrowly tailored").
283. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).
284. Id. § 231(a)(1).
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decision enjoining COPA's enforcement.285 For the majority, the
possibility of parents using filtering software was clearly a less restrictive
alternative to COPA's regulatory scheme backed by criminal sanctions.286
The fact that this approach depended upon parental cooperation did not
seem troubling:
The need for parental cooperation does not automatically
disqualify a proposed less restrictive alternative.... COPA
presumes that parents lack the ability, not the will, to monitor
what their children see. By enacting programs to promote use
of filtering software, Congress could give parents that ability
without subjecting protected speech to severe penalties.287
Justice Breyer, by contrast, was less sanguine that filtering software
could solve the problem of child access to harmful speech. First, he noted
that "filtering software costs money" and that "[n]ot every family has the
$40 or so necessary to install it.",28 8 He then pointed out that:

[Fliltering software depends upon parents willing to decide
where their children will surf the Web and able to enforce that
decision. As to millions of American families, that is not a
reasonable possibility. More than 28 million school age
children have both parents or their sole parent in the work
force, at least 5 million children are left alone at home
without supervision each week, and many of those children
will spend afternoons and evenings with friends who may
289
well have access to computers and more lenient parents.
Breyer also noted that filtering software is notoriously imprecise.29° It can
block websites that do not have objectionable material while failing to
block many pornographic sites.29 '
Whether Breyer's skepticism is justified is a factual question to be
addressed at trial. But the Pandora's box of issues raised by COPA
provides some insight into the potential complexity of the seemingly
simple question: "Do parents need state support?"
Finally, even if a court accepts that parents need state assistance to
control their children's access to harmful speech, what should courts do

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2792, 2795 (2004).
Id.at 2792-93.
Id.at 2793.
Id.at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.(Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2802-03 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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with those parents who want their children to have access to the speech?
Justice Brennan pointed out in FCCv. PacificaFoundation,for example,
that "some parents may actually find Mr. Carlin's unabashed attitude
towards the seven 'dirty words' healthy, and deem it desirable to expose
their children to the manner in which Mr. Carlin defuses the taboo
surrounding the words."292 Does it violate the rights of these "cool" parents
if the government, at the behest of "square" parents, prohibits minors'
access to the Carlin routine?
If the liberal parents have access to Carlin's routine, and the
government does not forbid them from sharing it with their children, then
their constitutional complaint is largely undermined. While they have the
additional burden of obtaining the speech for their children, this burden
must be weighed against the burden of parents who would have to police
their children in the absence of state censorship. The liberal parents might
complain that the government's ban teaches children that the language in
Carlin's routine is taboo, but the conservative parents could respond that
the absence of a ban would teach children that the words are socially
acceptable. The practical implications of balancing the interests of these
two sets of parents is considered in Part IV, which considers how courts
can ensure that child-protection censorship does not infringe on the rights
of parents.29 3
ii. The Limits of the "Parental Support" Exception
Even if all parents agreed that the government should deny minors
access to speech, there still must be limits on which types of speech the
government could ban. Otherwise, the government could deny minors
access to information about atheism or the Cuban revolution simply
because parents supported it. Just as the state's interest in protecting
minors from harmful speech must be limited, so must the state's power to
regulate speech on behalf of parents.294
But if not all varieties of state censorship on behalf of parents are
justified, which ones are? As was true with censorship aimed at protecting
minors from harmful speech, the answer depends upon the speech being
regulated. 295 Thus, bans on political speech, even if with universal parental
support, are unlikely to pass constitutional muster, whereas bans on "lowvalue" speech, such as indecent but not obscene materials, are more likely
292. 438 U.S. 726, 770 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
293. See infra Part IV.B.
294. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 959-60 (8th Cir.
2003) ("Nowhere in Ginsberg(or any other case that we can find, for that matter) does the Supreme
Court suggest that the government's role in helping parents to be the guardians of their children's
well-being is an unbridled license to governments to regulate what minors read and view.").
295. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
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to be upheld. Once again, this suggests that courts may have no choice but
to consider the relative value of the speech being regulated. Suggestions
discretionary process within principled limits
for how courts can keep this
29 6
are considered in Part IV.
Finally, one might expect that parental efforts to suppress speech that
is not harmful to minors will be met with skepticism. Courts might
conclude that the First Amendment prevents the government from
censoring nonharmful speech merely because parents want it suppressed.
If this proves to be true, then the parental support theory will justify the
suppression of speech only if the speech is also shown to be harmful.
Conversely, courts might be equally unwilling to uphold censorship on the
harm theory if the majority of parents wanted their children to have access
to the censored speech. If both of these propositions prove true, then the
parental support and harm theories for justifying child-protection
censorship will be inextricably related. Neither theory by itself would
justify the censorship. Instead, courts would uphold the censorship only if
it was supported by both theories (i.e., the speech was considered harmful
and most parents supported its suppression).
IV.

CAN CHILD-PROTECTION CENSORSHIP BE KEPT WITHIN

TOLERABLE LIMITS?

Even if child-protection censorship furthers one of the two interests
identified in Part III, it still may be unconstitutional. It seems highly
unlikely, for example, that minors could be denied access to information
about evolution even if most parents thought the information inappropriate
or social scientists demonstrated its harmfulness. This censorship would
raise serious concerns as to whether minors' First Amendment rights were
being violated. Similarly, even when child-protection censorship
legitimately denied minors access to speech, it still may be unconstitutional
if, in denying minors access to speech, it also denied adults access.297
These concerns point to the problem of keeping child-protection
censorship within tolerable limits. This Part considers that problem by
exploring how child-protection censorship can be structured to ensure that
it does not impinge upon the rights ofthe three constituencies most directly
affected by the law: (a) minors; (b) parents; and (c) adults.
A. Protectingthe Rights of Minors
Minors must have some First Amendment rights. Otherwise, the
government could deny them access to virtually anything, including ideas

296. See infra Parts IV.A.I.b, IV.A.2.b, IV.A.3.b.
297. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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about homosexuality, atheism, or socialism. If, as the Supreme Court has
said, minors possess First Amendment rights but those rights are not coextensive with those of adults,298 then judges must identify which ideas are
unprotected as to minors even though protected as to adults.
For judges to do this, they must consider the value of the speech being
censored.299 This process is at loggerheads with the First Amendment's
"neutrality" principle, which prohibits the government from deciding
which ideas are worthy of public discourse, but it is unavoidable once
courts conclude that some, but not all, speech aimed at minors may be
regulated. The Supreme Court, in fact, has often been forced to rank speech
in its First Amendment jurisprudence. 00 The Court, for example, has said
that obscene speech is not protected,3 ' that commercial speech is given
reduced protection,"' and that speech on matters of public concern is
protected more than speech on matters of private concern.30 3
Judges will have to engage in a similar ranking process when they
evaluate child-protection censorship. They cannot avoid this process, but
they can structure it in a way that limits their discretion. The obvious way
to do this is to build child-protection censorship rules upon the structure

298. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
300. Justice Stevens has candidly acknowledged the need for ranking speech. See, e.g., R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that
"[o]ur First Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection
of speech"). Others have indicated that it is inappropriate for the Court to do so. See generally
DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 36-37 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing Justice Stevens's
argument that the Court should place less emphasis on the prohibition on content discrimination);
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 135 (1999) (discussing
Justice Stevens's campaign for ranking speech and the opposition to it).
Sullivan and Gunther summarize the debate over the desirability of ranking speech:
Can the "lower value" approach be defended as enabling the Justices to deal
sensibly with relatively insignificant speech without risking dilution of the
protection for "political" expression at the core of the First Amendment? Or does
the "lower value" approach show the weakness of judicial efforts to check
majoritarian repression, by defining speech as "less valuable" in exactly those
situations where it most sharply attacks majoritarian values?
Id.
301. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
302. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(creating an intermediate standard of review for content-based regulations of commercial speech).
303. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
(providing greater protection for defamatory remarks about matters of public concern than for
matters of private concern); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1983) (providing greater
protection for government employee speech on matters of public concern than for matters of private
concern).
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created by existing First Amendment jurisprudence. By developing rules
that hew closely to the lessons of earlier jurisprudence, judges minimize
the risk that their actions will seem arbitrary.
Ifjudges were to do this, they would base child-protection censorship
jurisprudence upon two fundamental lessons. The first is that all contentbased regulations are inherently suspect.304 This lesson derives from the
anticensorship principle. 315 When applied to child-protection censorship,
it means that all child-protection censorship is presumptively
unconstitutional. This does not mean that judges can never find this
legislation constitutional. To the contrary, Part III presented arguments for
why governmental censorship to protect children may sometimes be
permitted notwithstanding the anticensorship principle." 6 But the lesson
does instruct judges to scrutinize child-protection censorship with a
skeptical eye. Unless they find a law adequately protective of -speech
interests, they should find it unconstitutional.
The second lesson is that not all speech is alike. The Supreme Court's
recognition that some types of speech are more valuable than others
suggests that child-protection censorship affecting any category of "higher"
valued speech is particularly suspect. Thus, the fact that the Court has
repeatedly acknowledged that "political speech" goes to the core of First
Amendment values suggests that child-protection censorship denying
minors access to political speech clearly would be unconstitutional.30 7 This
principle ensures that efforts to deny minors access to information about
socialism or the Vietnam War, for example, would be promptly
invalidated.
The categories of higher valued speech, however, are much broader
than mere political speech. Indeed, they cover almost the entire gamut of
knowledge, from science to the arts.3" 8 Child-protection censorship seeking
to censor any of these categories of speech (e.g., atheism, AIDS,
Renaissance art) would thus have to overcome a strong presumption of
unconstitutionality.
The opposite of "high-value" speech is not nonpolitical speech but a

304. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (stating that "[o]ur
precedents ... apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or
impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content").
305. See supra Part III.A.
306. See supra Part III.B.2.
307. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J.,concurring in the
judgment) (stating that "[c]ore political speech occupies the highest, most protected position" in
First Amendment jurisprudence).
308. SMOLLA, supra note 45, § 2:46 (stating that the Supreme Court has "steadfastly refused"
to limit First Amendment protection to just political speech, and that instead its protection extends
"to the almost infinite range of artistic, scientific, religious, and political issues that vex and cajole
the human imagination").
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narrow range of speech that, in the famous words of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, plays "no essential part of any exposition of ideas."3 °9 This
range is extremely narrow-even many of the categories identified in
Chaplinskyas unprotected are now protected.31 0 Yet Chaplinskyreflects the
principle that certain categories of speech are of such limited First
Amendment value that they are subject to greater governmental control.3"
This suggests that child-protection censorship is most likely to be upheld
when it regulates speech that borders one of these "low-value" areas of
speech.
Fortunately, this borderland is where legislators usually seek to censor
speech aimed at minors. Legislators typically have not denied minors
access to information about socialism or evolution, and when they have,
their efforts have been met with skepticism. 312 Instead, they have regulated
along the edges of speech that the Supreme Court has already identified as
having limited First Amendment protection.3 1 3 Thus, they have tried to
deny minors access to sexual speech that was not quite "obscene"; violent
speech that was not quite "incitement"; and commercial speech that was
not quite for "illegal" products. These are the logical places for legislators
to regulate minors' access to speech. The question is whether their attempts
to regulate speech beyond that which is unprotected to adults is
constitutional. The constitutionality of child-protection censorship in each
of these areas is considered below.
1. Regulation of Indecent Speech
Probably the most active area of child-protection censorship concerns
laws attempting to deny minors access to sexual materials. 4 Of course, the
Supreme Court has already said that obscene materials are not protected by
the First Amendment.3" 5 Child-protection censorship tests the limits of the

309. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
310. SMOLLA, supra note 45, § 2:70 (noting that many of the classes of speech identified in
Chaplinsky as unprotected "now receive substantial amounts of First Amendment protection").
311. Chaplinsky,315 U.S. at 571-72.
312. See, e.g., Zeke MacCormack, Wish They May,Harry Won't Vanish: Few Schools Are
Charmed into Banishing Potter Books, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 11,2002, at 1B (stating
that "[d]espite extensive protests, the American Library Association says few public school districts
have kept students from reading" the Harry Potter books).
313. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 806 (2000)
(discussing act regulating sexually-explicit programming on cable television); Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 859-60 (1997) (discussing act regulating sexual speech on the Internet); Denver Area
Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1996) (discussing act
regulating sexually-explicit programming on cable television); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 117 (1989) (discussing act regulating sexually-explicit telephone messages).
315. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
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First Amendment only when it suppresses nonobscene sexual material." 6
Part III suggested that any censorship of this "indecent"speech should
first pass empirical hurdles. More specifically, the government should offer
evidence that the speech is harmful to minors and that the regulation3 is
17
using the least restrictive means available to accomplish its objective.
Assuming the government has met these burdens, a court then must
determine whether the regulation is sufficiently precise to pass
constitutional muster. Each of these .issues is discussed below.
a. The Empirical Evidence on Indecent Speech
The requirement of empirical proof of harm is particularly troublesome
in the context of sexual speech. To begin with, there is a paucity of
empirical evidence. As noted in Part III, it is thought unethical if not illegal
to expose minors to explicit sexual materials.3"8 Consequently, little
research exists examining the impact of such speech.319 Studies exist on the
impact of mainstream materials on minors, such as minor responses to
sexual content on television.32 ° There are also studies on the impact of
sexually-explicit materials on adults.32 ' Extrapolations also can be made
from studies done with other types of speech, particularly violent speech.322
Even if adequate data can be found, other problems emerge. What, for
instance, can legitimately be considered a "harm" resulting from sexuallyexplicit speech? Is it harmful if it leads to minors engaging in protected
sex? Is it harmful if children become aware of their sexuality at an earlier
age? Is it harmful if children believe it appropriate to have multiple sex
partners or for married individuals to have affairs? While the answers to
these questions might be a resounding "yes" from a segment of the
population, it seems unlikely that there is a societal consensus that these
are harmful ideas. Parents differ widely over when and how they want their
children to become aware of their own sexuality. The adult world also

316. Legislation often refers to such materials as merely "indecent." See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S.
at 859 (discussing act regulating indecent as well as obscene speech).
317. See supra Parts III.B.2.a.i., III.B.2.b.i.
318. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
319. See Etzioni, supranote 66, at 38 (noting that "[e]thical considerations prevent researchers
from conducting experiments that directly test the effects of pornography on children" so that
"those who make strong arguments about why it is undesirable to expose children to such materials
must do so without evidence supporting their claims").
320. See YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supranote 18, § 6.2.3, at 153 (noting
that "[miost studies of the impact of sexually explicit material in the media on adolescents' sexual
attitudes and practices have been limited to the sexual content in mainstream media").
321. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY 31-48 (Rutledge Hill Press 1986).
322. See YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, ANDTHE INTERNT, supranote 18, § 6.2.1 (describing corpus
of empirical work on the impact of violent materials on children).
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evinces a wide range of sexual relations and behaviors.323
Finding these ideas harmful would be particularly troubling in light of
the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that sex is "a great and mysterious
motive force in human life" and "a subject of absorbing interest to
mankind through the ages. ' How could a subject of such enduring
importance be off-limits to minors? The Supreme Court has further
recognized that even unorthodox ideas about sexuality are fully protected
in the adult world. For example, in Kingsley InternationalPictures Corp.
v. Regents of the University,the Court held that a film could not be banned
merely because it portrayed adultery in a favorable light.325 Similarly, in
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court held that the idea of minors
engaging in sex was fully protected.326 If these unconventional ideas are
legitimate in the adult world, it might be surprising to find them
illegitimate in the world of minors.
Rather than focusing on these more controversial types of harms, courts
would be safer defining the harms from sexual speech in more limited
terms. Courts, for instance, might safely say that speech that causes
children to engage in unprotected sex is harmful. They probably also could
conclude that speech that causes minors to engage in sexual violence is
harmful. Finally, and most controversially, they might conclude that
minors, particularly young minors, are emotionally disturbed by exposure
to explicit sexual materials and that such exposure is therefore harmful.
Even if these harms are thought to be legitimate, courts still must
confront perplexing issues as to whether speech causes these harms. For
instance, if the harm is minors engaging in unprotected sex (e.g., resulting
in the spread of disease or unwanted pregnancies), then the problem might
be due to a lack of access to sexually-explicit speech rather than the
opposite. The harm might best be addressed by providing minors with
sexually-explicit materials about birth control and sexually-transmitted
diseases.3 27 Of course, some might say that the goal of the law should be
to encourage abstinence by limiting minors' access to materials that
encourage sexual relations. This is not an unreasonable position. Indeed,
some studies have found that minors who frequently watch "television with
a high degree of sexual content [a]re more likely to engage in sexual

323. The Supreme Court has powerfully endorsed the right of citizens to engage in consensual
sexual relations without interference from the state. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560
(2003) (finding unconstitutional a Texas law criminalizing homosexual sodomy).
324. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
325. 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959).
326. 535 U.S. 234, 246-49 (2002).
327. See Mireya Navarro, Experts in Sex FieldSay Conservatives Interfere with Health and
Research, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2004, § 1, at 16 (stating that "the American Association of Sex
Educators, Counselors and Therapists called the Bush administration's increased financing of
abstinence-only programs at the expense of comprehensive sex education a violation of children's
human rights").
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intercourse than those who" watch television with less sexual content.328
But there are two problems with this approach. First, it seems clear that the
idea that "sex is good" cannot be considered harmful to minors. Sex cannot
be both a "great and mysterious motive force in human life' 3 29 and offlimits to minors. Suppressing the message that "sex is good" could give
minors the psychologically destructive signal that their interest in sex is
unhealthy. This would be a throwback to the oppressive times when
Anthony Comstock warned that sexual literature "'breeds lust'

330

and

331
when Boy Scout manuals warned that "semen had to be hoarded.,
Second, the idea that "sex is good" is not exclusively conveyed by
sexually-explicit materials. Indeed, it pervades modem American culture
and is present in virtually every form of media. Denying minors access to
sexually-explicit materials is therefore likely to do little to advance the
cause of abstinence.
Discouraging violence in sexual relations is a more credible basis for
regulating minors' access to sexual materials. Empirical studies have found
a correlation between exposure to violent sexual materials and aggressive
behavior toward women. 332 Indeed, even critics of child-protection
censorship often acknowledge this connection.333 The irony courts confront
in this context is that Supreme Court obscenity jurisprudence has focused
entirely on speech's sexual nature (i.e., its "appeal to the prurient interest")
as opposed to its violent nature.334 The same has generally been true of
governmental efforts to regulate nonobscene indecent speech.335
Nevertheless, discouraging sexual violence might be a legitimate ground
for regulating minors' access to speech.
Finally, the potential harm of exposing minors, especially young
minors, to explicit sexual materials might be a basis for regulating
indecency. Here there likely is little empirical evidence because of ethical

328. YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 154 (also noting to the
contrary that "it is unclear whether viewing such content contributes to a teen's decision to engage
in intercourse, or instead, whether those who are already engaging in sexual activity are more likely
to seek out such programs").
329. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
330. HEINS, supranote 6, at 30 (quoting ANTHONY COMSTOCK, FRAUDS EXPOSED 416 (1880)).
331. Id. (quoting ERNEST THOMPSON SETON, BoY SCOUTS OF AMERICAN: A HANDBOOK OF
WOODCRAFT, SCOUTING, AND LIFE-CRAFT xii (1910)).

332. YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 18, § 6.2.2, at 152 (describing
research on the impact of sexually-violent materials).
333. Ross, supra note 43, at 505 (stating that, "[iun contrast to the dearth of support for the
notion that sexually explicit speech is harmful, substantial social science research... lends support
to the allegation that violent speech may lead some children to violent attitudes or actions").
334. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973) (defining obscenity as speech which "appeals
to the prurient interest"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 & n.20 (1957) (defining
"prurient" material as "material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts").
335. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783,2789 (2004) (stating that the Child Online Protection
Act definines speech as "harmful to minors" when it "is designed to appeal to, or is designed to
pander to, the prurient interest") (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 23 1(e) (6) (2000)).
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and legal restraints on research.3 36 Therefore, courts might have to rely on
empirical studies of adults and on psychological theories about the impact
of sexually-explicit materials on children."' They also might consider by
analogy studies on violent materials.338 This also may be an area where
courts will have to give legislators some "breathing room" in their
obligation to meet the empirical burden.3 39 At the same time, courts should
be attentive to the developmental differences among minors. Regulations
sheltering younger minors from sexually-explicit speech might be much
more compelling than those limiting the access of mature minors.
b. Keeping Regulation of Indecent Speech Within
Tolerable Limits
Assuming the government can meet the burden of establishing that
indecent speech is harmful to minors, the next question is whether any
given regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve the government's
objective. A court must determine whether the government has used the
least restrictive means available to accomplish its goal and has defined the
regulated speech in ways that are neither vague nor overbroard.34 °
Some of these issues have been addressed previously. For instance,
whether a regulation is the least restrictive means available may depend
upon the ability of parents to monitor their children, including their ability
to use screening devices like V-chips or filtering software.3 4 ' Even if
government regulation is necessary to assist parents, there still may be lessspeech-restrictive ways of regulating. For instance, a regulation that denies
336. See supranotes 211-12 and accompanying text.
337. See YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 18, at 153-60 (describing
research on the impact of nonviolent sexual material).
338. Id. §§ 6.2.1.-2.
339. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 45, 75-80 and accompanying text.
341. See supraPart III.B.2.b.i. Whether screening devices can effectively and constitutionally
shelter children from "bad" speech while not interfering with their access to "good" speech is a
matter of considerable contention. Filtering systems are only as good as the mechanism used for
separating the speech, whether it be decisions made by a human or automatically by a computer.
Moreover, the constitutionality of the system (at least when the rules for the system are embodied
in law) will largely turn on whether the rules identifying the regulated speech are not vague and do
not sweep in areas of protected speech. Even if the filtering mechanism is privately designed and
administered, it still might serve speech interests poorly, even if it does not implicate the First
Amendment. (In other words, are we confident that AOL or Disney will make good choices as to
what our children should see?) See generally J.M. BALKIN ET AL., YALE LAW SCH.,FILTERING THE
INTERNET: A BEST PRACTICES MODEL (1999) (discussing the pros and cons of various filtering
systems and proposing best practices for Internet self-regulation), at
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/isp/papers/Filters0208.pdf. (last visited Mar. 14, 2005); Lawrence
Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering,38 JURIMETRICS J. 629 (1998)
(discussing whether filtering is a constitutional solution to the perceived problem of indecency);
R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the FirstAmendment, 83 MINN. L. REv. 755 (1999) (discussing the
use and effectiveness of filters).
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both adults and children access to speech would be unconstitutional if it
was possible to deny access to only minors.342
This Part will focus on the problems of vagueness and overbreadth in
indecency regulation.343 Overbreadth problems arise when a law regulates
both protected and unprotected speech.3" Imagine, for instance, a law that
denied minors access to materials depicting "human nudity." This law is
not vague because its scope is clear, but it is overbroad because it affects
both protected and unprotected speech. The law would be unconstitutional
because it would deny minors access to art history books, sex-education
materials, and movies with even the mildest scenes of nudity.345 By
contrast, a law that denied minors access to "indecent" materials, without
defining indecency, would be unconstitutionally vague. It would be
unconstitutional because it would give people little guidance as to what
speech is covered by the prohibition. 346 People might choose not to
disseminate even protected speech for fear that it might fall within the
law's vague parameters.
Vagueness and overbreadth problems are endemic to any area of
unprotected speech. Unless the Supreme Court can define the unprotected
area with adequate precision, legislators must regulate without clear
guidance as to when their laws will cross the line from unprotected to
protected speech. The Court has had a particularly hard time defining
which sexual materials are unprotected by the First Amendment. For years
the Court could not agree on a workable definition of obscenity."' A
majority finally agreed to the test developed in Miller v. California,3 4 but
many judges and commentators continue to find this definition
unworkable.349

342. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
343. Vagueness and overbreadth problems have frequently been the basis for invalidating
child-protection censorship laws. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (finding the
Communications Decency Act unconstitutionally vague); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
390 U.S. 676, 678, 690 (1968) (invalidating a municipal licensing scheme that classified motion
pictures as "not suitable for young persons" because of its vague standards).
344. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 49, § 11.2.2, at 912-13.
345. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975) (stating that
"[c]learly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors").
346. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 49, § 11.2.2, at 910 (stating that a law is "unconstitutionally
vague if a reasonable person cannot tell what speech is prohibited and what is permitted").
347. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 300, at 109 (describing the Court's "Redrup"
approach, in which it issued per curiam reversals of convictions whenever five or more Justices,
"applying their separate tests," found the disseminated material not to be obscene).
348. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
349. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating
that none of the Court's formulas for defining obscenity, including the Miller test, "can reduce the
vagueness [of the tests] to a tolerable level"); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 49, § 11.3.4.2,
at 985 (noting that "some argue that obscenity should not be a category of unprotected expression
because of the impossibility of formulating a definition that is not impermissibly vague or
overbroad").
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Legislators intending to deny minors access to indecent materials must
build upon this shaky foundation. For some critics of indecency regulation,
this is an impossible task. They believe that any law that bans indecent
speech will inevitably chill protected speech. The line-drawing problem,
they contend, is simply insurmountable.
Ira Glass, the host of the public radio program This American Life,
eloquently made this point in a recent New York Times Magazine article
entitled Howard and Me.35 ° He comments on how the recent FCC
crackdown on The Howard Stern Show could just as easily have been
directed at his own show.35 He acknowledges that "lots of smart people
shrug off' the crackdown on Stem "as if it were nastiness going on in some
bad neighborhood of the broadcast dial," but he explains that the FCC's
' He
action has made him "Stem's brother as I've never been before."352
notes that curse words had previously been broadcast on his show, as had
a David Sedaris story about "excretory organs or activities," and that these
programs are just as vulnerable to FCC sanctions as anything on Stem's
show.353
Glass also implicitly suggests that the overbreadth problem cannot be
solved by limiting government censorship to "low-value" programming
(i.e., The Howard Stern Show but not This American Life). He alludes to
the impossibility of honestly making this distinction by pointing to the
important artistic and social value of the Stern show:
I'm the host of a show on public radio, and when my
listeners tell me they don't care for Stem, I always think it
reveals a regrettable narrowness of vision. Mostly, they're put
off by the naked girls. But Stern has invented a way of being
on the air that uses the medium better than nearly anyone.
He's more honest, more emotionally present, more
interesting, more wide-ranging in his opinions than any host
on public radio. Also, he's a fantastic interviewer. He's truly
funny. And his staff on the air is cheerfully inclusive of every
kind of person: black, white, dwarf, stutterer, drunk and
supposed gay. What public radio show has that kind of
diversity?3"
While Glass's points are well taken, what conclusion can be drawn
from them? Do they mean that government regulation of broadcast
indecency can never be permitted because it is impossible to draw
constitutionally tolerable limits? Many civil libertarians, of course, would

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

Ira Glass, Howard andMe, N.Y. TIMEs, May 9, 2004, § 6, at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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subscribe to this position, but it seems unlikely that the courts would, or
should, do so. The notion that there can be no limits on explicit violent or
sexual content, regardless of the time of day or the likely audience, seems
counterintuitive. It assumes either that exposing minors to this material is
harmless, or that this harm can be avoided by parental monitoring of
children. The latter claim, in light of Justice Breyer's earlier observations
about the absentee rate of parents, seems factually unsupportable.3 5 The
former claim, while perhaps difficult to prove empirically, is contrary to
the opinions of many, if not most, in the expert community. 3 56Neither can
those who oppose indecency regulation because of its vagueness take
refuge in the argument that the government always can regulate obscene
speech. This may be true as a matter of First Amendment jurisprudence,
but it only skirts the issue. Obscenity has the same vagueness and
definitional problems as indecency; the doctrines are merely two peas in
the same pod.
If courts are unwilling to forbid all indecency regulation, they will have
to wrestle with the difficult problem of keeping this regulation within
constitutionally tolerable limits. While this may be a nearly impossible
task, it is perhaps one worth pursuing. Indeed, even Justice Brennan, who
ultimately concluded that obscene speech must be protected because it is
impossible to define, nevertheless agreed that this admittedly undefinable
speech could be kept from minors.357
How, then, can courts police the regulation of indecency to ensure that
the Ira Glasses, as well as the Howard Stems, of the world can sleep at
night? There is, of course, no magical rule to pull out of a hat to solve this
problem. To the contrary, indecency analysis is likely to remain highly
contextual, depending upon when and where the speech was
communicated, the likely audience, and the accessibility of the speech to
children. To protect First Amendment interests adequately, courts must
find ways to compensate for the inherent vagueness in the indecency
standard. In this regard, there may be lessons to be learned from the
admittedly less-than-perfect Miller obscenity test.
Miller's first lesson is that obscenity laws must "specifically define[]"
the speech being regulated.358 Courts similarly should require any
indecency regulation to be as specific as possible. This specificity could
refer not just to the images or speech involved, but also to the time and

355. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 43, 97 and accompanying text.
357. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79-80, 106-07 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
358. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (stating that an obscene work must depict
or describe in "a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specificallydefined by the applicable state
law") (emphasis added).
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place in which the speech is communicated. If parties have to speculate
about whether they are violating the law, First Amendment principles
should dictate that their speech is protected.359
Miller also provided that the government could regulate only a work
that, "taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. 3 60 As Justice Brennan rightfully pointed out, this test is itself
deficient because it allows works of value to be suppressed as long as their
value is not "serious. 3 61 But the test sends a signal to courts that they must
be cautious in ensuring that obscenity regulations do not impinge upon
works of value. This should be equally true of any indecency regulation.
Of course, Ira Glass might argue that this distinction is impossible to
make.3 62 But perhaps the way to compensate for this difficulty is not to
deprive the government of any power to regulate, but rather to limit its
power to "channeling" speech away from those times and places where
children are most likely to be exposed. Courts also can compensate for the
ambiguous nature of the standard by placing restrictions on the sanctions
available to the government. Criminal sanctions or severe fines would be
359. One of the primary complaints about the FCC's recent clampdown on broadcast
indecency is that the agency has failed to specifically define what constitutes "indecency." See Scott
Robson, You Can't Do That on Television!, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2004, § 2, at 1 (Jeff Filgo, the
executive producer of That 70's Show, notes that "[tihe problem is the F.C.C. is trying to enforce
a standard that doesn't exist"). FCC Chairman Michael Powell responded to this complaint in an
Op-Ed in the New York Times:
For material to be indecent in the legal sense it must be of a sexual or
excretory nature and it must be patently offensive. Mere bad taste is not
actionable. Context remains the critical factor in determining if content is legally
indecent. Words or actions might be acceptable as part of a news program, or as
an indispensable component of a dramatic film, but be nothing more than sexual
pandering in another context. That context and the specific facts of each program
are reasons the government can't devise a book of rules listing all the bad stuff.
In 2001, however, the agency issued policy guidelines summarizing the case law
on indecency, and each new ruling since then clarifies what is prohibited.
Michael K. Powell, Don't Expect the Government to Be a V-Chip, N.Y. TImES, Dec. 3, 2004, at
A29; see also Stephen Labaton, Indecency on the Air, Evolution at F.C.C., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
2004, at El (stating that Chairman Powell had evolved from an "unbridled libertarian" who
opposed indecency regulation to an "aggressive enforcer," but suggesting that this evolution might
have occurred for political reasons: Powell "concluded that he could not carry on his fight against
the indecency rules and also survive politically to carry out the rest of his agenda"). See generally
FCC Policy Statement on Broadcast Indecency, supra note 27 (providing an overview of the
Commission's enforcement policies on broadcast indecency).
360. Miller,413 U.S. at 24. Miller's"serious value" prong is based on a national standard and
not, like the prurience and patently offensive prongs, on local community standards. Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 579 (2002).
361. ParisAdult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
362. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
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inappropriate in any context in which the speech arguably has redeemable
value and the speaker reasonably could have believed that the speech
would not have been actionable.
Lawmakers sometimes have drawn on the Miller obscenity model in
drafting indecency regulations. One of the more common approaches has
been to modify the Miller test by adding the language "as to minors" to
each of Miller'sthree criteria.363 Critics might rightfully say that this only
adds a vague step to an already vague standard, but it should be acceptable
as long as legislators adhere to Miller.'s second prong, which requires that
they "specifically define[]" the type of sexual materials being regulated. 3"
If legislators adhere to this requirement, their laws may overcome a
vagueness challenge.3 65 The question, then, would be whether such laws
were overbroad. This would depend on how sensitive the legislators were
to free speech interests. If they regulate only speech near the outer edge of
the obscenity exception, if they choose to channel speech rather than ban
speech, and if they place strict limits on any sanctions so that speakers
legitimately testing the regulation's limits will not be cowed into silence,
then their regulations will more likely be upheld.
2. Regulation of Speech Depicting or Advocating Violence
Unlike obscene speech, speech depicting or advocating violence or
unlawful behavior is generally protected by the First Amendment. Speech
advocating violence or lawlessness is protected except when directed to
inciting imminent lawless action and when likely to produce such action.3 66
Speech depicting violence is similarly protected.367
While this speech is largely protected as to adults, the logic underlying
its protection suggests that a broader range of speech might be unprotected

363. See, e.g., State v. Evenson, 33 P.3d 780, 782 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (describing an
Arizona statute that defines the unprotected speech by using a modified Miller test).
364. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
365. See Nunziato, supra note 14, at 127 (noting that Miller's specificity requirement "helps
to reduce the potential for unconstitutional vagueness").
366. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). A speaker can lose First Amendment
protection by conspiring with another to commit an unlawful act or by directly aiding another's
unlawful action. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 236, 242-43, 267 (4th Cir.
1997) (finding the First Amendment did not bar an action against the publisher of a "hit man"
manual for aiding an abetting three murders).
367. See, e.g., Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(applying Brandenburgtest to determine liability of television network for broadcasting fictional
rape scene that was imitated by teenagers who raped the plaintiff). See generally Richard C.
Ausness, The Application of Product Liability Principles to Publishers of Violent or Sexually
Explicit Material,52 FLA. L. REV. 603,658-59 (2000) (stating that "[t]hose who claim to have been
injured by the portrayal of violent material in movies or video games are ... unlikely to prevail as
long as most courts rely on the Brandenburgstandard").
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as to children. The Supreme Court's leading case, Brandenburgv. Ohio,36 8
draws a line that focuses on the proximity of speech to a listener's
action.369 If speech is likely to incite "imminent lawless action" by a
listener, then the speaker can be punished for inciting the action.37° But if
there is time for the listener to think about his or her response to the
"'
speaker's message, then the speaker is protected.37
This "imminence" requirement suggests that the causal connection
between speaker and actor is severed for purposes of legal responsibility
when an actor is capable of deciding for him or herself how to respond to
speech. Absent the danger of imminent harm, the speaker may not be
punished for voicing an idea no matter how noxious. Responsibility for any
improper actions rests with the independent individual who chose to act on
the idea and not with the idea's messenger.
This logic suggests that a different standard might be appropriate when
speech advocating lawlessness is aimed at minors. The vulnerability of
children, particularly their "'inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner,"' suggests that children cannot adequately
mediate between what they are told to do and what they should do. 31 2 Thus,
whereas speakers should not be held accountable if adults act on their
ideas, they might bear greater responsibility when their words are directed
at children.
If one accepts this logic, legislators might be permitted to regulate
inciting speech aimed at children even when it does not satisfy the
Brandenburgtest. They also might be permitted to regulate speech that
depicts graphic violence on the theory that these depictions might
encourage minors to imitate the violence.
Before a court sustains this type of regulation, it should require
empirical evidence that the speech being regulated is harmful. If the
regulation passes that hurdle, the court should then examine the regulation
to make sure that it does not unlawfully impinge upon protected speech.
a. The Empirical Evidence on Violent Speech
The empirical analysis of violent speech is relatively simple compared
to that of sexual speech. To begin with, the relevant "harm" is easier to

368. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
369. See id. at 447-48.
370. Id. at 447.
371. For an early statement of this principle, see Whitney v. California,274 U.S. 357,376-77
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that a "clear and present danger" will exist only when
there is evidence of "immediate serious violence," and noting that "[i]f there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence").
372. See supranotes 175-78 and accompanying text (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
634 (1979) (plurality opinion)).
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identify. Virtually all members of the child-protection censorship debate
probably would agree that speech causing violence is problematic. The
debate, instead, is over whether violent speech actually leads to violent
behavior.
As noted earlier, scholars continue to debate whether empirical
evidence supports the claim that violent speech leads to violent behavior.373
Nevertheless, even critics of child-protection censorship tend to concede
that the empirical support for the harmfulness of violent speech is much
stronger than that for sexual speech. Catherine Ross, for instance, notes
that "[i]n contrast to the dearth of support for the notion that sexuallyexplicit speech is harmful, substantial social science research conducted
over several decades lends support to the allegation that violent speech
may lead some children to violent attitudes or actions. 374
Proponents of child-protection censorship, such as Saunders and
Etzioni, point to the numerous studies finding a correlation between media
violence and acts of violence, and to the multitude of professional
associations that have called for regulation of violence in the media. 375 The
President of the American Academy of Pediatrics, for instance, testified
before a Senate Committee in 2000 that, since the 1950s, over "3,500
research studies" have been conducted on "whether there is an association
between exposure to media violence and subsequent violent behavior," and
"[a]ll but 18 have shown a positive correlation. ' 376 He also noted that
epidemiologists found "exposure to violent media" to be a factor in half
the homicides committed in the United States in a single year.377 If this
empirical evidence is sufficient to demonstrate the harmfulness of violent
speech, then courts will have to move on to the difficult task of figuring
out the limits of permissible government regulation.
b. Keeping Regulation of Violent Speech Within Tolerable Limits
Censorship of violent speech raises many of the same definitional
problems that have proven so perplexing in the area of sexual speech. Too
broad a definition of the speech being regulated would sweep in Saturday

373. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
374. Ross, supra note 43, at 505.
375. SAUNDERS, supra note 43, at 43-46; Etzioni, supra note 66, at 35-37.
376. Media industries have described such characterizations ofthe empirical evidence as being
"wildly inaccurate" and have said instead that the evidence linking televsion violence to real
violence is "weak and inconsistent." Robert Corn-Revere, Regulating TV Violence: The FCC's
NationalRorschach Test, COMM. LAW., Fall 2004, at 1, 24, 25.
377. Marketing Violence to Children:HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci.,
and Transp., 106th Cong. 119 (2000) (prepared statement of Donald E. Cook, M.D., FAAP,
President, American Academy of Pediatrics).
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morning cartoons and classic adventure stories.3 78 Too narrow a definition
would only cover speech that satisfies the Brandenburgtest.37 9 Legislators
would be wise to follow the lessons mentioned above for regulation of
indecent speech. First, they should define the unprotected speech with as
much precision as possible.38 ° This parallels the requirement in Millerthat
patently offensive sexual materials be "specifically defined" in the
applicable regulation.38 ' Second, they should limit the scope of their laws
to speech that closely approximates the type of speech that the Supreme
Court already has declared unprotected.382 In the context of speech
depicting or advocating violence, this means speech that is especially likely
to engender a violent or unlawful response. Regulations that censor speech
with only a weak causal connection to action are likely to be
unconstitutional.383
Violent video games, especially those in which the child stands in the
position of the shooter, are perhaps the most likely candidates for
regulation under this principle. While the empirical evidence on their
impact is still limited, scholars have contended that these games

378. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518, 520 (1948) (finding
unconstitutionally vague a New York law that prohibited the distribution of materials "made up of
criminal news or stories of deeds of bloodshed or lust [that are] so massed as to become vehicles
for inciting violent and depraved crimes").
Judge Richard Posner has eloquently pointed out the danger of broadly denying children access
to violent materials. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir.
2001). In enjoining a city ordinance that forbade children from playing violent video-arcade games
without parental supervision, he noted that "[p]eople are unlikely to become well-functioning,
independent-minded adults and responsible citizens if they are raised in an intellectual bubble." Id.
He continued:
No doubt the City would concede this point if the question were whether to
forbid children to read without the presence of an adult the Odyssey, with its
graphic descriptions of Odysseus's grinding out the eye of Polyphemus with a
heated, sharpened stake, killing the suitors, and hanging the treacherous
maidservants; or The Divine Comedy with its graphic descriptions of the tortures
of the damned; or War and Peace with its graphic descriptions of execution by
firing squad, death in childbirth, and death from war wounds.
Id.; see also Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 92, at 2 (Bume Neubome testifying before a
Congressional committee that "any effort.., to decide when speech depicting violence crosses the
line from an acceptable exercise in artistic creation, as in Hamlet or Oedipus Rex, or Antigone, or
The Crucible, to a forbidden depiction of 'gratuitous' or 'excessive' violence must involve purely
subjective notions of taste and aesthetic judgment").
379. See supra notes 368-71 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 45, 75-80 and accompanying text.
381. See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 368-72 and accompanying text.
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desensitize children to the effects of violence and condition them to kill.384
Dave Grossman, a former military psychologist, has made chilling
observations about the impact of violent video games.38 5 He notes that the
military trains soldiers by using computer simulations that are comparable
to the first-person shooter games that children play.386 These games help
soldiers overcome their resistence to killing and develop conditioned
responses to shooting at targets. 387 Grossman and a co-author, Gloria
DeGaetano, note in their book, Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill: A Call to
Action Against TV, Movie and Video Game Violence, that Michael Carneal,
the assailant in the Heath High School massacre, committed his crime just
as the video games had taught him:
Michael Carneal... never moved his feet during his rampage.
He never fired far to the right or left, never far up or down. He
simply fired once at everything that popped up on his
'screen.' It is not natural to fire once at each target. The
normal, almost universal, response is to fire at a target until it
drops and then move on to the next target.... But most video

games teach you to fire at each target only once, hitting as
many targets as you can as fast as you can in order to rack up
a high score. And many video games give bonus
effects ... for head shots. It's awful to note that of Michael

Carneal's eight shots he had eight hits, all head and upper
torso ....

And this is from a kid who, prior to stealing that

gun, had never shot a real handgun in his life!388

Both the Seventh and Eighth Circuit may have been too cavalier in
brushing aside arguments about the harmfulness of violent video games.
384. Marketing Violence to Children: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci.,
and Transp., 106th Cong. 119 (2000) (prepared statement of Donald E. Cook, M.D., FAAP,
President, American Academy of Pediatrics) (noting that "[r]esearch to date indicates that
interactive media have an even more potent and lasting effect on violent behavior than passive
media forms like television and movies"). But see Calvert, supra note 20, at 24-30 (criticizing
empirical studies on the impact of violent video games).
385. See generally DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING
TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY (1995) (arguing that the unrestrained desensitization, conditioning,

and defense mechanisms provided by modem video games and violent media is a potential threat
to society); DAVE GROSSMAN & GLORIA DEGAETANO, STOP TEACHING OUR KIDS TO KILL: A CALL
TO ACTION AGAINST TV, MOVIE & VIDEO GAME VIOLENCE (1999) (arguing that violent television
programming and video games is complicit in conditioning young people to mimic the violence
they see on the screen).
386. GROSSMAN & DEGAETANO, supra note 385, at 74 (noting that "one of the most effective
and widely used simulators developed by the United States Army ... is nothing more than a
modified Super Nintendo game").
387. Id. at 71-76.
388. Id. at 75-76.
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The Seventh Circuit's comparison of the violence in video games to the
"graphic descriptions" in the Odyssey of "Odysseus's grinding out the eye
of Polyphemus with a heated, sharpened stake" or to the "graphic
descriptions" in War andPeace of "execution by firing squad"3'89 suggest
that the court may have misunderstood the unique desensitizing and
conditioning effects of realistic and graphic video games. The Eighth
Circuit's observation that "literature is most successful when it 'draws the
reader into the story .'390 suggests that the court may have underestimated
the effects of repeatedly standing in the shoes of a murderer in a
graphically-realistic environment.
Yet, both courts left open the possibility that a more narrowly drawn
regulation of violent video games might pass constitutional muster. The
Seventh Circuit conceded that, if the games "used actors and simulated real
death and mutilation convincingly, or if the games lacked any story line
and were merely animated shooting galleries," then "a more narrowly
drawn ordinance might survive a constitutional challenge."'39' Likewise, the
Eighth Circuit implied that an ordinance on video games might be
sustained if the government brought forth "'substantial supporting
evidence' of harm. 392
These demands for specificity and empirical support were echoed in a
recent Seattle district court decision that enjoined the enforcement of a
Washington state law that penalized the distribution of violent video games
to minors. 393 After deciding to enjoin the enforcement of the act, the court
posed the more philosophical question of "whether a state may ever impose
a ban on the dissemination of video games to children under 18." 9 Citing
Ginsberg,the court said that "[t]he answer is 'probably yes' if the games
contain sexually explicit images., 395 The court said that the answer is
probably "'maybe' if the games contain violent images, such as torture or
' The court then
bondage, that appeal to the prurient interest of minors."396

389. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
390. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954,957 (8th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577).
391. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 579-80.
392. InteractiveDigitalSoftware Ass 'n,329 F.3d at 959 (quoting Eclipse Enters. v. Gulotta,
134 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 1997)).
393. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1188 (W.D. Wash.
2004).
394. Id. at 1190.
395. Id.(citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634-38 (1968); Kendrick, 244 F.3d at
574-76, 579).
396. Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). The court's insistence that the
violent images "appeal to the prurient interest" is borrowed from the Supreme Court's obscenity
jurisprudence. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The child-protection censorship law sustained in
Ginsbergused a modified obscenity test that asked whether material appealed to minors' prurient
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the

-does the regulation cover only the type of depraved or
extreme acts of violence that violate community norms and
prompted the legislature to act?
-- does the regulation prohibit depictions of extreme
violence against all innocent victims, regardless of their
viewpoint or status? and
-- do the social scientific studies support the legislative
findings at issue?.3 98
As can be seen, the decision implies that regulations of violent video
games might be sustained if they are narrowly drawn (covering only
"depraved or extreme acts") and are supported by "social scientific
studies."3'99 This suggestion accords with the arguments made above.
3. Regulation of Advertisements for Vice Activities
A third area of child-protection censorship targets advertisements of
vice activities. Legislators have expressed concern that these
advertisements induce children to engage in vice activities and have
enacted laws to limit minors' exposure to the advertisements (e.g.,
restricting advertising on billboards near schools)." 0

interests. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 632-33. Nevertheless, the "appeal to the prurient interest"
requirement seems misplaced in the context of violent speech. The Supreme Court has defined
material appealing to the prurient interest as "material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts."
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,487 & n.20 (1957). Violent materials, while arguably harmful
to minors, are not necessarily likely to excite lustful thoughts. In other words, any justification for
regulating violent speech should not be based on its appeal to the prurient interests. Indeed, as
argued in the section on indecent speech, it is even doubtful whether the appeal to the prurient
interest requirement is a legitimate basis for regulating sexual materials. See supranotes 326-30 and
accompanying text (suggesting that material cannot be suppressed because it suggests to minors that
sex is healthy or desirable).
397. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1190.
398. Id.
399. Id.Legislation should not, for example, be broad enough to sweep in graphic depictions
of violence in classic literature (e.g., Odysseus grinding out the eyes of Polyphemus). Such
overbroad legislation would ignore the requirement that regulations may not suppress works of
serious social value. See supranotes 358-59 and accompanying text. Thus, the government could
not ban all depictions of particularly heinous violent acts such as amputations, decapitations, or
dismemberments, but only those that were depicted in graphically-realistic interactive video games
in which the user perpetrated the acts.
400. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 534-35 (2001) (discussing a regulation
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Once again, if courts are to uphold this type of regulation, they should
build upon earlier jurisprudence. Most obviously, the Supreme Court
already has indicated that "commercial speech" is entitled to reduced First
Amendment protection.4 "1 The logic underlying thisjurisprudence suggests
rules for when child-protection censorship of vice-advertising should be
constitutional.
This analysis, however, is complicated by the fact that the Supreme
Court has been moving away from its original conclusion that commercial
speech is entitled to reduced protection. The Court acknowledges that
advertising of unlawful products, as well as false and misleading
advertising, is unprotected.4 2 But recent decisions suggest that truthful
advertising of lawful products will be fully protected.4 3 This is true even
if the speech advertises vice activities such as smoking, drinking, and
gambling. While earlier jurisprudence suggested that legislators had more
leeway to regulate this type of advertising, the Court has since repudiated
4' The Court has instead suggested that the government may not try to
it.
control people's behavior by limiting what they hear. The government may
regulate the activities themselves (e.g., it can tax cigarette consumption or
make it illegal), but it cannot seek to control usage by "keep[ing] people
in the dark."4 5

that prohibited outdoor advertising for tobacco products "within a 1,000 foot radius of any public
playground, playground area in a public park, elementary school or secondary school"); AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing a Baltimore ordinance
banning outdoor advertising of alcoholic beverages in places where children are likely to walk or
play).
401. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(applying a four-part test to regulations of commercial speech).
402. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996).
403. One can reach this conclusion by piecing together the rationales in the multiple decisions
in 44 Liquormart, Inc. Four Justices openly stated that the government may not suppress truthful
advertising of lawful products for the sole purpose of trying to influence consumer behavior. Id.at
501-05 (Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg); id at 526 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Other Justices applied the Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. test in a manner that would
effectively make it impossible for the government to satisfy the test when it is regulating truthful
advertising of lawful products. Id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id at 524-26 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting how the other Justices' strict application of the CentralHudson Gas & Electric
Corp. test always will result in invalidation of regulations of truthful advertising).
404. In Posadasde Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341, 346-47 (1986),
Justice Rehnquist suggested that legislators had greater leeway to regulate vice activities. The Court
rejected this logic in 44 Liquormart, Inc. See 517 U.S. at 514 (stating that "the scope of any 'vice'
exception to the protection afforded by the First Amendment would be difficult, if not impossible,
to define").
405. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 503. This position is most forcefully recongized in
Justice Stevens's opinion. Id. (stating that "bans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech.., rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond 'irrationally' to the
truth").
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Despite this recent trend, commercial speech jurisprudence continues
to provide powerful arguments for permitting regulation of vice advertising
aimed at children. To begin with, the Supreme Court's acknowledgment
that advertisements for unlawful products are unprotected would justify
regulation of most vice-advertising aimed at children because most of the
advertised activities (smoking, drinking, gambling) are unlawful for
children." 6 In addition, the acknowledgment that misleading advertising
is also unprotected might give regulators greater power to legislate in the
context of child-protection censorship because children are arguably more
easily misled than adults (recall their inability to make "informed, mature"
decisions).407
a. The Empirical Evidence on Vice-Advertising
The harm from vice advertising, like the harm from violent speech, is
easily identifiable. The harm is that children will be persuaded by the
advertising to adopt a vice activity, whether it be smoking, drinking, or
gambling.
While the empirical claim that advertising leads to use might seem
straightforward-indeed, an entire multibillion dollar industry is premised
on this causal connection-the social science evidence is not conclusive.4 °8

406. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that a
Baltimore ban on outdoor advertising for alcoholic beverages "expressly targets persons who cannot
be legal users of alcoholic beverages").
407. See supra note 372 and accompanying text. A more difficult question is whether
advertisements for products that minors can lawfully consume can be constitutionally regulated for
the paternalistic purpose of dampening minor demand for the products. The Supreme Court has
become increasingly hostile to such paternalistic regulation in the adult context, and it has insisted
that the government instead rely on non-speech alternatives to influence adults' purchasing
behavior (i.e., taxing products or placing limits on how much can be purchased). See supranotes
402-05 and accompanying text. The question is whether the Court should be more tolerant of
paternalistic regulation when the advertising is targeted at minors. Senator Harkin, for example,
recently decried the food industry's heavy marketing of "nutritionally deficient products" to
children and said he was going to introduce a bill to broaden the Federal Trade Commission's
power to regulate this advertising. Melanie Warner, Guidelines Are Urged in Food Ads for
Children, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at C7. Of course, to the extent that this advertising implies
that the food has greater nutritional value than it really has, the government could regulate the
advertising as misleading. But even if the statements on the advertising are truthful, the Court still
might permit this regulation if the advertising is targeted at children (such as Shrek on boxes of
cereal consisting ofsweetened corn puffs and marshmallow pieces). Id. The logic for tolerating such
regulation would be that it is necessary to protect children because oftheir "peculiar vulnerability"
and "inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner." See supra note 176 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, the Court still might, as it has done in the adult context, insist that
legislators use non-speech alternatives (such as regulating the content of foods) rather than using
speech regulation to manipulate children's behavior.
408. Lee, supra note 111, at 1283 (noting that the "literature on advertising's effects reveals
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Still, there are studies and anecdotal evidence that can lend support to the
premise.
Perhaps some of the best evidence comes from studies of cigarette
advertising. While tobacco companies have had to curtail this advertising
as a result of their recent settlement with the states,4"9 their past practices
provide plenty of grist for the empirical mill. The Surgeon General found
that cigarette advertisements "'play a significant and important
contributory role' in minors' "'decision[s] to use.., tobacco products'
and noted that minors, unlike adults, were most likely to make their choice
of brands based on advertising.4"' Of course, the most notorious tobacco
industry advertisement aimed at children was "Joe Camel." A 1991 study
published in the Journalof the American Medical Association found that
"30% of 3-year-olds and 91% of 6-year-olds could identify Joe Camel as
a symbol for smoking."4 1 After the Joe Camel advertising campaign
began, Camel's "share of the youth [cigarette] market rose from 4% to
13%. ' '412 Tobacco companies also negotiated placement of their products
in children-oriented entertainment. Etzioni notes, for instance, that internal
company documents revealed that Phillip Morris negotiated the placement
of its products in Who FramedRoger Rabbit? and The Muppet Movie.4 13
If the government can establish the harmfulness of the vice-advertising
being regulated, a court then would examine the regulation to determine
whether it is narrowly drawn.
b. Keeping Regulation of Vice-Advertising Within
Tolerable Limits
The definitional problems with vice-advertising are less daunting than
with violent or sexual speech. The Supreme Court has well-developed
precedent on the definition of commercial speech, including cases that
wrestle with advertisements that combine informational and promotional
that the impact of advertising on sales is uncertain").
409. See Etzioni, supranote 66, at 22-23 (discussing settlement agreement between states and
tobacco companies).
410. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 558 (2001).
411. Nicotine in Cigarettes, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 45,246 (Aug. 28, 1996) (citing Fischer et
al., Brand Logo Recognition by ChildrenAged 3 to 6 Years, Mickey Mouse and OldJoe the Camel,
266 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 3145 (1991)).
412. LorillardTobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 558; see also Etzioni, supranote 66, at 22 & n.106
(quoting a CDC report indicating that "[t]he largest increase in adolescent smoking initiation was
in 1988, the year that the Joe Camel cartoon character was introduced nationally") (quoting Nat'l
Ctr. for Chronic Disease Prevention & Health Promotion, Trends in Smoking InitiationAmong
Adolescents and Young Adults, MoRBDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., July 21, 1995, at 521).
413. Etzioni, supra note 66, at 21 & n.98 (citing National Ass'n of Attorneys General,
Tobacco Settlement Agreement at a Glance, available at http://www.naag.org/issues/
tobacco/msa at a glance.php (Nov. 6, 1998)).
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The larger problem is that advertising is almost never targeted solely
toward children. Whether the advertising is on billboards, in magazines, on
television, or on sports cars, both adults and children generally have access
to it. This presents the problem that any censorship also will deny adults
access to speech. That issue will be explored more fully in the Part
concerning the rights of adults.41 5 Nevertheless, the commercial speech
jurisprudence provides some guidance for that discussion. To begin with,
the conclusion that vice-advertising aimed at children should be wholly
unprotected suggests that regulators should receive leeway to regulate
advertising directed to the public if the nature of the advertising suggests
it is particularly aimed at children. Thus, the fact that "Joe Camel"
appeared on advertisements available for all to see should not have
sheltered it from regulation if regulators could establish that it was aimed
at children. 16 More generally, to the extent that the Court still subscribes
to the notion that commercial speech is entitled to less protection than
other forms of speech, it might justify permitting more regulation of the
speech for the sake of protecting children, even if the regulation impacts
adults' access to the speech.
4. Protecting the Rights of Mature Minors
Part I1identified the concern that child-protection censorship relies on
crude generalizations to determine which parties should be denied access
to speech. 4 17 The laws assume that all minors lack adequate maturity to
handle an unregulated marketplace of ideas. The truth, however, is that
there are many minors who are just as able as adults to process the full
range of protected speech.
The discussion suggested that the government may have little choice
but to rely on these generalizations in enacting child-protection censorship
laws. It considered the propriety of this reliance under equal protection
jurisprudence and concluded that censorship rules using age classifications
are probably constitutional.4 1 8 The only exception was those situations

414. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,471-72 (1989); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 61-62 (1983).
415. See infra Part IV.C.
416. States have found an alternative route to limit cigarette advertising. Rather than banning
such advertising, which would raise First Amendment concerns, they instead succeeded in getting
the tobacco industry to limit its advertising as part of a larger settlement of tort actions brought by
the states againstthe industry. SeeNat'l Ass'n ofAttorneys Gen., MasterSettlement Agreement and
Amendments, at http://www.naag.org/issues/tobacco/index.php?sdpid=919 (last visited May 3,
2005) (displaying the settlement agreement between states and tobacco companies).
417. See supra Part III.B. L.b.
418. See supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
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where information of critical and immediate importance was denied to a
mature minor.419
Courts are unlikely to conclude that cigarette advertisements,
pornography, and graphic violence ever are of critical and immediate
importance to a minor. Information is likely to meet this criteria only if it
is a type of higher valued speech, such as information about reproductive
rights, sexually-transmitted diseases, or drug addiction. Because this type
of censorship implicates higher valued speech, it would be inherently
suspect and usually unconstitutional when applied to any minors.
Nevertheless, there may be instances in which regulators reasonably could
conclude that this type of information was inappropriate for very young
minors. This is precisely the type of regulation that courts should carefully
scrutinize to ensure that the rights of mature minors are protected. Unless
the law limits its scope only to young minors or, at a minimum, provides
an opportunity for mature minors to be exempted from its reach, it may be
unconstitutional. Of course, child-censorship laws do not punish minors
who access the censored speech but instead punish those who give the
minors the information. Nevertheless, minors who are denied access by a
child-protection censorship law should have standing to challenge a law to
the extent that it impinges on their First Amendment right to access
speech.42°
B. Protectingthe Rights of Parents
Part Il also identified the concern that child-protection censorship laws
might impinge upon the rights of more liberal parents who did not want
their children to be denied access to censored material.42 ' Legislators
should be careful not to infringe on the rights of these parents when they
enact child-protection censorship, and courts should be prepared to review
censorship laws to ensure that these parents' rights are protected.
Of course, if the majority of parents do not approve of a childprotection censorship law, then the law as a whole would be of
questionable constitutionality. It certainly could not be justified under the
theory that it assists parents with their child-rearing responsibility. It also
is doubtful that the government could declare the speech harmful to minors
when most parents disagree.
The issue of protecting parental rights is more likely to arise when a
minority of parents object to a child-protection censorship law. These
parents may not be troubled that their children have access to the banned

419. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
420. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
756-57 (1976) (upholding the right of consumers to challenge a restriction on pharmacists' speech).
421. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
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speech and may even feel that their children would benefit from exposure
to it. The question is whether a law violates the rights of these parents if it
prevents their children from gaining access to the speech. This, of course,
is a somewhat circuitous argument as it is the children and not the parents
who are being denied access. Nevertheless, a child-protection censorship
law might be viewed as impinging on the parents' right to control their
children's upbringing.422
In most instances, this problem can be avoided if legislation makes it
clear that parents are not prohibited from obtaining the banned material
and giving it to their children. 23 While parents still would be
inconvenienced in the sense that they would need to obtain the materials
for their children, this inconvenience probably would not be enough to
justify a finding that their rights have been infringed.
Legislators, of course, are free to enact a child-protection censorship
law that does not have a parental exemption. Such a law presumably would
reflect a legislative determination that the speech being censored is
sufficiently harmful to children so that even a child's parents should not be
permitted to expose the child to it. The problem with such legislation is
that it stands in conflict with a parent's competing right to control his or
her child's upbringing. Precedents suggest that the government can
override this parental right when the government's interest in protecting a
child is sufficiently compelling.424 But this exception typically is limited
to instances of more obvious parental neglect, such as when a parent is
physically abusive toward a child. It seems unlikely that the government
could meet this burden in most cases when the only harm it alleges is that
a parent exposed his or her child to speech.
C. Protectingthe Rights ofAdults
Child-protection censorship will impinge on the rights of adults only
when, as a means of denying minors access to speech, it also denies adults
access. There are many instances in which this spillover problem can be
avoided. Pornographic magazines, for instance, can be sold in adult

422. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
423. Legislators should try to avoid the mistake that Congress made in drafting the
Communications Decency Act. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Reno v. A CLU, "[u]nder the
CDA, a parent allowing her 17-year-old to use the family computer to obtain information on the
Internet that she, in her parental judgment, deems appropriate could face a lengthy prison term."
521 U.S. 844, 878 (1997).
424. Edward C. v. Edmond C., 178 Cal. Rptr. 694, 701 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (acknowledging
that First Amendment protection of freedom of religion limited the government's power to interfere
with parental rights in controlling the upbringing of their children, but finding that governmental
intervention was justified when parents' religious beliefs ordained excessive discipline that
jeopardized children's health and safety).
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bookstores that deny entrance to minors. Similarly, adult movie theaters
can limit admittance to those eighteen and over. The rights of adults are
likely to be implicated only when it is impossible to separate adults from
children. It is impossible, for instance, to regulate indecency in radio
broadcasts without implicating access for both adults and children.
The ability to effectively separate minors from adults has figured
prominently in Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning child-protection
censorship. The Court typically has upheld censorship regimes that
preserved adults' access to the censored material and invalidated those that
did not.425 The Court has condemned these latter laws as "bum[ing] the
house to roast the pig" because they "reduce the adult population ...to
[hearing] only what is fit for children."426
Whether a censorship law succeeds in denying minors access while
protecting adults' rights often depends upon how the adults' rights are
defined. For instance, the Court could hold that a blanket ban on indecency
on the Internet would not impinge upon adult rights so long as adults could
obtain the material from their local adult bookstore. In other words,
banning speech in one medium (i.e., television, radio, the Internet) would
be permissible so long as adults retain access to the materials elsewhere.
The Court, however, has declined to follow this logic. In Reno v. ACLU,
the Court specifically rejected this argument, implying that the First
Amendment rights of adults are implicated whenever they are denied
access in any medium.427 The availability of other means to obtain similar
material does not erase the First Amendment concerns.428
While the Court's reasoning in these instances is not entirely clear, its
conclusion appears correct. To begin with, the conclusion is consistent
with the Court's general approach to content-based regulations. Such
regulations are subject to strict scrutiny and usually found unconstitutional
even when they affect First Amendment rights only in limited contexts.429
Thus, a ban on political speech in one city park would be unconstitutional
even though citizens were free to give the same speech in the other city
parks.4 30 The specter of government censorship raised by content-based

425. See supranotes 16, 53 and accompanying text.
426. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957); see also Sable Communications of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73
(1983).
427. 521 U.S. 844,879 (1997) (rejecting the government's argument that the Communications
Decency Act was "constitutional because it provide[d] a 'reasonable opportunity' for speakers to
engage in the restricted speech" on some but not all Internet modalities).
428. See id.at 880.
429. See supranotes 45, 51, 71 and accompanying text.
430. See id. (stating that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place") (quoting
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

83

FLORIDA
Florida Law Review,
Vol.LAW
57, REVIEW
Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 2

[Vol. 57

laws is of sufficient concern to render a law presumptively unconstitutional
even when alternative avenues for the speech are available.
Perhaps more importantly, the Court's rule shows appreciation for the
uniqueness of each medium of expression and the sometimes subtle effect
that blocking speech in one medium can have on First Amendment rights.
For instance, if the government banned indecent speech on the Internet,
adults still might be able to obtain it (e.g., by going to an adult bookstore),
but they might not be able to obtain it anonymously, as they could do on
the Internet. Consequently, adults who desired indecent speech but were
too embarrassed to do so publicly might be denied access to the material.
A rule that respects the First Amendment rights of adults for each medium
better protects such subtle differences between various means of accessing
speech.
Of course, if a censorship regime succeeds in denying minors access to
speech without affecting adults, then the Court should reject arguments
that the law violates adults' First Amendment rights. In those instances in
which such perfect zoning is not possible, the Court has three choices. At
one extreme, it could hold that the government's interest in protecting
minors trumps the adults' right of access. Such an approach clearly is
undesirable. It gives the government carte blanche to regulate adults'
access whenever it could justify denying minors access. This effectively
would reduce adult discourse to "that which would be suitable for a
sandbox,"431 a result that the Court repeatedly has held is unacceptable.432
At the other extreme, the Court could say that an adult's right to access
speech should always trump the government's interest in protecting
children, so that child-protection censorship will be permitted only when
a law is able to deny minors access to speech without affecting adults. This
approach might permit lawmakers to insist that "girlie" magazines be sold
at adult bookstores and that adult movie theaters be restricted to grownups, but the government would be powerless to regulate those media, such
as television and radio, where separating children from adults is
impossible.
A middle ground approach would be for the Court to balance the
government's interest in censoring speech to protect children against the
competing First Amendment rights of adults to have access to the censored
speech. Unless the Court is prepared to deprive the government of all
power to regulate media such as television and radio, it may have little
choice but to follow this approach. Indeed, the leading case in this area,

431. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74-75.
432. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 875; Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759 (1996); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128
(1989).
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4 33 suggests that the Court will follow this
FCC v. PacificaFoundation,
course. In that case, the Court upheld a sanction issued against a radio
station for broadcasting George Carlin's "Filthy Words" routine during the
middle of the day.434 By upholding the FCC sanction, the Court was
acknowledging that indecent speech could be banned from the radio even
though the ban also would affect adults' rights to hear the speech. At the
same time, the Court emphasized the narrowness of its holding, suggesting
that the ban might be unconstitutional if applied at a time when only adults
were likely to be listening (e.g., late at night).435
If the Court is to engage in such a balancing test, it must develop a
means for measuring the strength of the government's interest in censoring
speech to protect children as well as the extent of the burden on adults'
First Amendment rights.4 36 In considering the former, the Court should
consider some of the issues raised in Part III of this Article, which
considered when the government is justified in censoring speech to protect
children.437 In considering the latter, the Court might consider such factors
as whether adults could easily access the banned material through other
outlets, even though, as mentioned above, that fact by itself should not
warrant a conclusion that adults' rights are not infringed. Other factors
might be whether there are technological ways of separating children from
adults or whether it would be sufficient merely to "channel" the censored
speech to a time of day when children are less likely to be exposed.

V. CONCLUSION

There is no simple solution to the clash of values that occurs when
society regulates speech to protect children. Lawmakers have little choice
but to walk a tightrope between the interest in protecting children and the
interest in protecting speech. Finding the right balance is difficult because
each interest has a powerful pull, and each pulls in a different direction. If
lawmakers lean too far toward protecting children, they threaten freedom
of speech. Ifthey lean too far toward free speech, they threaten the welfare
of children. Judge Dalzell thus was correct in stating that the interest in
protecting children is "as dangerous as it is compelling."438 Proponents of
child-protection censorship undoubtedly would say the same is true for the
interest in protecting speech.
433. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
434. Id. at 729-30.
435. Id. at 750 (emphasizing the "narrowness" of the Court's holding and, in particular, the
fact that the FCC's decision emphasized the "time of day" that the show was broadcast).
436. See generally Volokh, supra note 43, at 169-93 (surveying various tests for deciding
whether child-protection censorship laws affecting adults' access should be constitutional).
437. See supra Part III.B.
438. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Dalzell, J., concurring).
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In this Article, I have tried to help lawmakers navigate this tight-rope.
By analyzing the legal and policy issues raised by child-protection
censorship, I have sought to provide lawmakers with tools for identifying
the issues raised by child-protection censorship and for methodically
resolving these issues. The process still will never be simple; there are too
many underlying factual issues for it to be so. But if this Article helps
lawmakers understand the layers of issues underlying child-protection
censorship's constitutionality, it will have served its purpose.
Judge Dalzell's quote about the "compelling" but "dangerous" nature
of child-protection censorship439 captures the two themes that permeate this
Article. One is the theme that child-protection censorship can sometimes
serve a compelling state interest. This assertion is based on the
propositions that children are less mature than adults and that their
exposure to certain types of speech can be harmful. These propositions are
neither absolute nor unassailable. There is a wide range of maturity among
minors, and the harmfulness of speech is something that will forever be
debated. But the propositions also have considerable expert and empirical
support, not to mention a basis in common sense.
The competing theme is that child-protection censorship can be
"dangerous" to freedom of speech. This means that judges must
methodically police this censorship to ensure that the threat it poses to First
Amendment values is kept to an absolute minimum. Censorship should not
be allowed unless judges are convinced that the speech is harmful and that
parents support its suppression. Direct suppression should not be allowed
when a less speech-restrictive means exists to accomplish the
government's objective (i.e., Can parents protect their children without
government help? Will filtering devices provide adequate protection?).
Regulations must be specific, ensure that valuable speech is not
suppressed, and provide for penalties that will not chill speakers
legitimately testing the regulation's limits. Regulations also must ensure
that adults will have access to the speech, and if there must be some limits
on adults' access, legislators must ensure that there are easily accessible
alternatives that respect adults' rights of anonymity.
After these checks are in place, lawmakers will have only very
circumscribed powers to enact child-protection censorship. One might
wonder if this whole effort is worth the candle if that is all that the
Constitution will allow. The answer is "yes," however, because allowing
this minimal speech regulation may be necessary to protect minors from
speech that is harmful to them. Proponents of censorship, for example, may
be right that children should not play video games that the military uses to
teach soldiers how to kill. If empirical evidence supports their claim, it

439. Id. (Dalzell, J., concurring).
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should not be unreasonable to deny minors access to these games until they
reach eighteen.
At the same time, if judges are sensitive to free speech rights and
attentive to the numerous constitutional hurdles that any censorship regime
must overcome, they can ensure that this limited legislative power to
suppress speech on children's behalf will be adequately monitored.
Children will then still be able to read about Odysseus's grinding out the
eyes of Polyphemus and the bloody executions in War and Peace."'
Assuming, of course, that their parents can get them to read! 44

440. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
441. Charles McGrath, What Johnny Won't Read, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2004, § 4, at 3
(discussing a National Endowment for the Arts report which found that reading in America,
particularly of literature, had declined during the last twenty years).
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